Byzantium’s Greatest Emperors (Part II: Seventh to Fifteenth Centuries)

Rolando Castillo

Translated by Owen Williamson

The reign of Justinian II might have somewhat resembled that of Justinian the Great, that is if one ignores the fact that the times as well as the customs and situation of the Empire were very different from what they were 150 years earlier.

Justinian II wanted to imitate his namesake by ordering the construction of great public buildings and for this purpose he saddled the unhappy population with an excessively heavy tax burden.

His policy of colonization was also merciless, forcing entire peoples to be transferred to foreign and very distant regions, committing the grave error of ripping from their homelands peoples who were vital for the defense of the Empire’s frontiers against the Muslim Caliphate. This short-sighted policy left the borders increasingly vulnerable, with painful consequences for the future of the Empire.

Justinian II was an emperor who during his blood-soaked reign did not shrink from violence but rather responded with even more violence. Following the counsel of evil advisors (Stephen and Theodotus), he committed error after error in defense of the Empire. In a military uprising supported by the Blues, Leonicius, the Strategus of the theme of Helade was proclaimed Emperor and Justinian II ended up having his nose cut off, disqualifying him from the imperial throne. His advisors were publicly lynched. Justinian, the ex-emperor with no nose, was exiled to distant Cherson.

Later on, Leoncius, who ruled only from 695 to 698, was deposed by the same people who had proclaimed him emperor and was replaced by the admiral Apsimar, who took the name Tiberius II (698-705).

Justinian fled Cherson on learning that that he would soon be transferred to Constantinople. He finally became a friend of the Khazars in whose kingdom he married the sister of the Khan.

Tiberius II deeply distrusted Justinian and sent a delegation to ask the Khazar Khan to return the deposed monarch as a prisoner. However, Justinian learned of this plan just in time to flee once again.

After innumerable hardships, Justinian’s vengeful spirit led him to Khan Tervel’s Bulgars whom he convinced to become his allies. Together they reached the gates of Constantinople in 705. However, his Bulgarian army found itself powerless before the city walls and the citizenry made a mockery of his return.

Nonetheless, on the fourth night of the siege Justinian fearlessly slipped into the city under cover of darkness, evidently through the pipes of an aqueduct, together with several of his comrades-in-arms. He then recruited his old followers inside the city and ended up sowing terror which provoked the terrified emperor Tiberius II to flee.

Justinian sent for Theodora, his Khazar wife, to join him in the city and regaled the Khan Tervel and his Bulgar friends with gifts and honors.

Justinian II Rhinometos, the emperor without a nose, punished Leonicius and Apsimar, who was captured while attempting to escape. The two were brutally executed in the Hippodrome before the people of the city and their heads were cut off.
Justinian pursued his enemies with fire and sword, murdering hundreds of people in the capital who were suspected of plotting against him.
Meanwhile, the Arabs took full advantage of the civil war that had been ignited by the emperor himself by pushing deep into Byzantine territory in Anatolia.
Justinian ordered an army to Ravenna to sack the city and kill its main officials in revenge for the city’s betrayal of him. Later he did the same to Cherson, but even more mercilessly.
However, the attack on Cherson sparked a military revolt against the wave of violence that had cost the lives of many of their best men, unleashing a general uprising that ended with the beheading of the emperor. The revolutionaries under the command of Philipicus Bardanes also executed the emperor’s young son and heir, Tiberius, thus putting an end to the Heraclian dynasty after a century of rule over Byzantium.
Justinian’s head was publicly displayed in Ravenna to the joy of the survivors of the cruel sack of that city. The monster with no nose was no more.
Leo: The first iconoclastic emperor
Introduction
The early 8th century began an extremely difficult era for the Byzantine Empire which during the previous century had lost the rich provinces of Syria, Palestine and Egypt to the Arabs. We must note that these provinces were of extreme importance not only because of the economic power held by the cities of Antioch and Alexandria but also due to the importance of the art, literature and theology that had arisen there as well as the fact that the seats of the Patriarchs were there and in Jerusalem.
These losses permanently changed the character of the Empire, now reduced to control of Greece, the Balkans and Asia Minor.
Nor did Byzantium have any significant control in the West, having been reduced to a few areas in the south of the Italian peninsula whose north and central regions had fallen to the bloodthirsty Lombard invasion (even though this territory had never been particularly loyal to the Empire even in the best of times).
What is more, since the previous century the first Bulgar kingdom had begun to form in Byzantine territory south of the Danube, a development which would add a new and nearby enemy and create countless future problems.
To complete the panorama, Greece had in recent centuries become more and more Slavic. Little by little, year after year, the Slavs advanced even as far as the Peloponnesus, leaving to Asia Minor the burden of consolidating the future Empire.
However, in spite of the general anguish and pain that was caused by the loss of important territories, an urgent need to assimilate new peoples like the Slavs as well the ongoing wars with their neighbors gave the Byzantines other things to think about, and even served to benefit the Empire in some ways. In their territory there was a new sense of unity due to the increased degree of integration and religious homogeneity among the population. Considering the opposition role the Monophysite majority had played in Syria and Egypt, the Empire’ losses were in some degree compensated by the advantages of becoming a smaller, Orthodox Christian Empire without significant internal centers of dissent.
Thus an end was put to competition between the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. These three religious leaders had maintained a rivalry among themselves as well as with the patriarch of Constantinople, to whom accrued an unquestioned religious importance and who became the greatest single influence over the emperors.
In this era the Byzantine Empire at long last achieved its own true character in both human and social terms. One who was unaware of its history might not guess that it was a continuation of the Roman Empire, since Latin was no longer spoken anywhere, only Greek, which had become the official language of legislation and administration. Long forgotten was Justinian I’s dream of recovering the West, in territory as well as in culture. Byzantium had now transformed itself into a sort of Greek Empire straddling the line between Europe and Asia, acquiring its own unique identity distinct from that of the kingdoms of East and West, possessing elements of both but integrated in a distinct form that was perhaps unique in the history of the world.
In any case, it is helpful for us to understand that the inhabitants of the Empire, even though speaking the Greek language, even with their customs, art and administration that were so different from those of the ancient Roman Empire, even with their radically reduced territorial control, always considered themselves Romans. Constantinople was the New Rome and they were the Roman Empire. Even their enemies considered them to be Romans, and, as is well known, a civilization may be best defined by its enemies.
This that we could call the New Empire was, in any case, an endangered species. Not only had it been territorially reduced but it was also threatened with death by the magnificent rise of Islam which had taken place largely at the territorial expense of Byzantium.
The religious enthusiasm of Muhammad’s followers, which in turn exacerbated the Byzantines’ Orthodox religious enthusiasm, meant that mutual hatred continued to grow even as the two different cultures were absorbing elements from one other.
The Caliphate was determined to gain control of the Empire’s remaining territories just as it had completely put an end to Sassanid Persia during the previous century.
What is more, one must take into account the anarchy that the Empire suffered thanks to the ongoing usurpations of power that finally brought down the Heraclian dynasty, a line which had begun brilliantly and ended in the most abject disaster.
After the final fall of the despotic and bloodthirsty Justinian II in 711 (the emperor who had lost his nose after the uprising that had ended his first reign), he was succeeded by the emperors Phillip, Anastasius II and Theodosius III, weak and mostly ineffective rulers who reigned amidst social disorder, anarchy and revolt.
The last, a simple fiscal official who was named emperor against his will by a faction of the army, soon reached the limit of his abilities without being able to do anything about the disorder and malaise that had overtaken the whole Empire. In the best decision he ever made he chose to abdicate on 25 March, 717 in favor of Leo III, who was in the process of engineering an imminent coup. Theodosius opted to retire to a monastery in Ephesus.

Leo III, who was governor (Strategos) of Anatolia (the theme of Anatolicon), was very popular in the Empire due to his extremely successful campaign against the Alans. Although he was called the Isaurian because of his supposed Isaurian origin, there are studies that locate his birthplace in Germanicia, a region in the north of Syria, which would give him a completely different profile, above all in the religious upbringing he might have received. This factor would be of immense importance in understanding his actions, which had an enormous influence on the Empire’s future life.

The truth was that the only thing the new emperor inherited from the Heraclian dynasty which had once saved the empire from disappearance was the capital itself and a little territory that surrounded it; the situation facing Byzantium was that grave.

Emperor Leo III: Savior of the Empire and of Europe

In the face of this somber panorama and taking into account the concrete differences between the aggressive and expansionist Arab Caliphate and the tottering Byzantine Empire that was in fact at the verge of disappearing, it was clear that sooner or later a definitive confrontation would occur, and Leo III was perfectly aware of this threat. Thus, from the very moment he was proclaimed Emperor he desperately dedicated himself to preparing the city’s defenses.

Leo III was an excellent army commander, close to forty years old, well trained and with a great deal of experience in the struggles against the barbarians.

After carefully thinking through the strategy required to complete the conquest of the Roman Empire, Suleiman, Caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, decided in 717 to subject it to the same fate as Sassanid Persia rather than to continue trying to occupy Byzantine territories piecemeal in Asia Minor as had been done up to that time, where he had been unable to cross the Taurus line. He would besiege the capital, Constantinople, and once the city was taken by storm he could easily gain control of the rest of the Empire.
Thus he prepared a spectacular strategy, an idea of such grand scope that its success would surely leave his name among the great conquerors of history: an attack by sea carried out by the mighty Arab fleet, coordinated with a land attack that would attempt to overcome the famous and until-now invincible triple wall of Theodosius.
That very same year he put the plan in march: The land army of more than one hundred thousand men under the command of Maslamah, brother of the Caliph Suleiman left from Pergamon, crossed the Hellespont and arrived on 15 August, 717 to confront the terrified capital which looked like its glory days were at an end.
Meanwhile, ever since 1 August the powerful Arab navy under the command of general Suleiman and comprised of about eight thousand vessels had surrounded the capital by sea.
Luckily for Constantinople, its own navy was still sizeable and its captains were very good sailors and even better fighters. Thus they were able to hold off the Arab navy and easily re-supply the city by sea so the besieged did not suffer extreme hardships.

The first fierce Arab attacks were followed by periods of relative calm, and then once again an all-out attack. So the months dragged on with repeated cycles of attack and of relative quiet.
This time the energy, the organization and the calm were all in favor of the Empire with its Emperor at the head of its defenses as was his duty, enjoying the incalculable advantage of the triple wall, a monument to military engineering.
However, the essential weapon in the defense of the city was something that nobody but the Byzantines knew about, and for this reason it was called Greek Fire: a secret formula that produced a sticky incendiary mixture that could not be extinguished even on water. This secret weapon had the advantage of not only starting fires and inflicting casualties on the enemy, but also sapping their morale, seeing that the Arabs felt powerless before it and constantly threatened by it. Above all, the attackers realized that they possessed no such similar weapon in battle and, in a word, felt overpowered by such a weapon which, just as importantly, the Byzantines utilized with great skill.
Another great enemy of the Arabs was the intense and bitter winter of the year 718. Needless to say, Arabs often feel less than comfortable in lands with cold climate, a factor which increased the besiegers’ suffering even more.
On the other hand we have to point out that Leo III was an excellent diplomat. In spite of the risks involved he concluded a treaty with the Bulgars after convincing them of the danger that would be posed to them as well by an Islamic conquest of the region. Thus, Bulgar forces began to harass the besieging army in the spring of 718, just when the Arabs were receiving reinforcements and making their supreme effort to cross the great walls, causing many casualties and great loss of spirit in the ranks of the besieging army.
Totally discouraged, the demoralized invaders abandoned the siege by order of Maslamah exactly one year after it began, 15 August, 718, with a terrible final toll of around one hundred thousand dead due to combat, starvation or the previous winter’s intense cold.
Even worse, the retreat of the Arab fleet was disastrous, first of all because of the Byzantine navy’s attacks on their rear guard which destroyed a large number of ships, and then due to a severe storm that completed the job of liquidating the attacking fleet as a fighting force.
With this all-around victory the Empire was rescued for the second time in its history (the first was in the previous century while Heraclius was on campaign against the Persians who had taken Syria, Palestine and Egypt, when the Patriarch Sergius organized the defense of the city against Persian and Avar attack).
Thus Leo III became the hero of all, the real savior, combining in his own person unlimited power and the admiration of all the inhabitants of the renewed Empire.
This victory over the Umayyad Caliphate could be considered the salvation of the West, equally or more important than the battle of Poitiers in 732 when Charles Martel defeated the Saracen invasion from south of the Pyrenees. The most important consequence was that the unlimited expansion of Islam was contained, now confined to fighting for territory in Asia Minor with a much smaller scope of ambition. After their defeat the Arabs came to believe that Constantinople was protected by some sort of divine power, a belief that drew the danger considerably away from the West and allowed the creation of a new foundation for a new Empire that would stand for centuries as a bastion in the struggle against the Arabs and later against the Turks.
If Constantinople would have been taken, Islam, the Umayyad Caliphate with the its limitless strength in those days, with the incredible army that it could mobilize and with the religious enthusiasm that was its principal weapon, would have been unstoppable in its conquest of the rest of Europe.
It is for this reason that the figure of Leo III represents the great Christian victory of that era in the battle for Constantinople against Islam. He was the emperor who led his people to victory, who maintained calm and order at the most crucial moments, who used all the weapons at his disposal, everything from patience, alliances, strategy and fierce defense to the good luck which crowns the victorious, such as winter’s lethal cold.
Rebirth of the Empire
With peace, trade and commerce was able to redevelop.
Although peace was reestablished at least in the capital and nearby regions, the struggle against the Arabs returned to Asia Minor but remained no less fierce. Leo III dedicated himself with his characteristic strength and decisiveness to organizing his government in the best manner possible.
He published special regulations governing trade and commerce (nomos nauticos), which were gradually being restored and were once again lending strength to the tottering Empire. He also addressed the social situation of the peasantry (nomos georgicos), who in some regions had disappeared due to the wars and invasions and in other areas had undergone a great turnover of population particularly because of the influx of the Slavs.
Leo III was also an energetic renovator of the Empire’s administrative apparatus, although in this task he continued the tendency that had begun under Justinian, was affirmed by Maurice and was followed by Heraclius as well: unifying the themes or provinces under a single governing authority (Strategos) who controlled both civil and military affairs.
In addition, he reduced the size of the themes and thereby created an efficient organization with more provinces of smaller size, increasing their economic, financial and military effectiveness to the Empire’s great benefit and simultaneously reducing the possibility of revolts by governors of powerful themes (one may recall that the Emperor himself had originally usurped power by relying on the support of the army of the then-enormous theme of Anatolicon, in Asia Minor).
In the realm of finances Leo was an intelligent administrator. He imposed more taxes on Sicily and Calabria and he seized the income generated by the papal territories in Italy, establishing a fundamental equilibrium between the Empire’s permanent state of war and the enormous expenses that this required.
He also organized the legal system of the Empire, ordering the most eminent jurists of the time to produce an update of the 6th century compiled works of Tribonianus, the Digest, the Institutes and the Novels, which were written in Latin, a language no longer current among the inhabitants of the Empire.
There were also countless numbers of usages and customs that needed to be put into law, given that the Latin-language Codes had fallen into disuse because they had simply become incomprehensible. Together with the changes to be expected with the passage of centuries, this created the need to have on hand a new code of laws better adapted to the new society and published in Greek.
From this idea came the Ekloga, which as well as summarizing the Codes of Justinian added new laws generally aimed at affirming public morality, prohibiting abortion, limiting the causes for divorce and condemning homosexuality with even heavier sanctions.
Once again a link with the ancient Roman Empire was definitively broken, since Latin had become only a memory in the Empire.
Leo III’s Beliefs: the Iconoclastic Controversy
It is not surprising that every so often a new religious controversy would emerge in the East, being that the passion of its people gave rise over time to a number of heresies which had been condemned by different Christian councils, e.g. Arrianism in the era of Constantine the Great, or a century later the followers of Nestorius, patriarch of Constantinople, who preached against the Holy Trinity.
This was also the origin of Monophysitism, which the population of Syria and Egypt had massively embraced because it was much simpler than Orthodoxy with its sumptuous and complicated rituals.
The Monophysites were so numerous and of such importance that many emperors offered them certain advantages, such as for example Zeno, Anastasius, Justinian (only occasionally at Theodora’s urging) and even Heraclius, even though others dedicated themselves to sometimes-bloody persecutions. On this point Byzantine policy did not maintain any consistency over the centuries, which in turn became a deciding factor in undermining the Monophysite population’s loyalty to an Empire that had no respect for their beliefs.
Just when it seemed that the Empire had finally gained a certain degree of religious homogeneity, from the hand of Leo III there came a new controversy which in its earliest years seemed to impose itself “almost” naturally, but which later provoked growing opposition and even violence.
Virtually since the beginning of its history with the foundation of Constantinople in 330 the Empire’s Christian inhabitants had images of Christ and the Virgin, carried them as standards in battle, adorned their churches with them, displayed them in different public places and no less, kept them in their own homes.
The veneration of images was finally accepted by the Ecumenical Council of 692. However, according to some Christian theologians influenced by Arab beliefs (which around the year 700 prohibited religious images in mosques) and by Jewish theologians who had always remained enemies of visual representations of a religious character, this veneration had become adoration. The images had become idols worshipped by the people, something which according to these theologians Christianity could not accept, given that it reduced Jesus Christ and Mary to mere images to be worshipped.
We have already spoken about Leo III and his origins; his family was from northern Syria in the region of Germanicia although later he ended up living in Thrace. This may have been because of the Arab conquest of his homeland or perhaps due to the capricious actions of the nefarious Justinian II who had ordered the redeployment of important contingents who had been serving as a bulwark against the Islamic conquerors whose domain extended through northern Syria.
This is very important to gain some understanding of the Emperor’s ideas, which were most probably influenced by Arab beliefs regarding images.
Also understandable was the swift adoption of these ideas, given that the Arab world was achieving such a rapid expansion (to an extent that is probably unique in all of history) that it astounded the known world. In that era it was only logical for people to conclude that this success was due to Islamic religious beliefs, and if one adds to this a terrible earthquake which was blamed (perhaps intentionally) on the worship of images it is possible to make a conjecture about the emperor’s true motives for beginning his iconoclastic campaign.
On the other hand, the images were so important to the Byzantine people that it is impossible to believe that iconoclasm could triumph in the long run, so deeply did it run against the grain of Byzantine culture. Nonetheless, the energy and decisiveness that were so characteristic of this emperor would once again impose themselves upon the Empire.
Perhaps what bothered Leo III the most was the fact that the images were credited with divine powers. They were objects of adoration because one could ask favors of them just as though they were idols, and this made them objects of worship.
There is no doubt that the Emperor was acting on the basis of his own convictions when in 726 he decided to spark the iconoclastic struggle by ordering the removal of the famous painting of Christ from the Bronze Gate of the Grand Palace. The tumult that resulted from this action left a toll of one soldier dead, a number of citizens wounded, and many iconodules [those who supported the veneration of icons] under arrest.
There were two immediate consequences: first, Pope Gregory II condemned the Emperor’s interference in church affairs and cut off Italian funds for the Empire. Secondly, there was a serious coup attempt which originated in Greece, from whence a fleet sailed for Constantinople with Kosmas as a replacement candidate for the Priest-Emperor. However, when they clashed with the Imperial Fleet at the Hellespont the rebels were defeated and Kosmas was executed.
Not long thereafter in the year 730 Leo III published an edict prohibiting the adoration of images, provoking a grave conflict with Patriarch Germanus, an ardent iconodule and defender of the images who refused to approve it.
Without a moment’s hesitation Leo III convoked the Sliention, the supreme council of laymen and ecclesiastics which approved the edict in support of the Emperor.
Germanus immediately resigned and was replaced by his assistant, Anastasius, provoking the ire of the eastern Patriarchs and of Pope Gregory II, who excommunicated the new Patriarch, opening a schism between the eastern and western churches that would not heal for more than a century.
In spite of his victory in imposing iconoclasm, which at this point was supported by a large part of the population who had the same feelings about the subject as the Emperor, Leo III never convoked an Ecumenical Council to impose his beliefs.
The strong support that the Emperor enjoyed in his struggle against the images was mostly based on a strong feeling of envy toward the monks in the richest monasteries, who as well as exercising an ever-stronger influence in Byzantine society were accumulating vast wealth based on tax exemptions and large donations. This situation provoked an intense religious reaction, with the Emperor itself acting as its main crusader and participant.
Due to the Emperor’s ban on the adoration of images a large number of Greek monks opted to “exile” themselves to the south of the Italian peninsula, mostly to the cities of Bari, Amalfi and Salerno where they could continue their customary iconodule ways beyond the effective reach of the edicts. This was partially due to an intelligent decision of Leo III who was well aware that the Empire did not hold great sway in these provinces.
Gregory II convoked a Council which condemned iconoclasm, but Leo’s response was not long in coming: he had the members of the Papal legation in the Byzantine capital placed under arrest and then removed the provinces of Italy, Sicily and the prefecture of Iliria from Rome’s jurisdiction, placing them directly under that of Constantinople. Additionally, all the tax revenues of Rome would henceforth go directly into the Imperial treasury.
Thus began the distancing of the Papacy from the Byzantine Empire and its gradual rapprochement with the Frankish kingdoms, a process which would culminate in the year 800 when the Pope would crown Charlemagne as Emperor, receiving vast amounts of territory in reward.
It is not the purpose of this study to analyze the consequences of the iconoclastic policies of Leo III, but one may draw the conclusion that it was due to iconoclasm that the Empire finally lost the already weakened ties that it had with the West. If one examines Byzantium’s situation at the time of Leo’s coronation it is possible to note that he accomplished veritable miracles and always acted based on his convictions. In any case, by 717 this gulf between East and West had become practically unbridgeable.
The Profile of a Great Head of State: An Enthralling Personality
The years of Leo III’s reign were marked by his political, religious, administrative and military convictions; in everything he did he lived up to the ideals of a good military officer, a great strategist, an excellent diplomat, and (as he liked to refer to himself) a Priest-Emperor, absolutely convinced of the rightness of his own ideas.
He gave the Empire a new lease on life, organized the lives of its inhabitants, gave them laws in their own language and reorganized the Empire’s economy and finances. With a gift for command he energetically confronted both foreign and domestic enemies, and victory always walked at his side.
He consolidated the borders with the Arabs, winning battle alter battle and always marched at the head of his army until his great victory in 740 in the decisive battle of Akroinon, in Phrygia.
He held the Papacy at bay as a power-center that was growing behind the Empire’s back. He took several provinces and their tax revenues, even though he did not dare to take Ravenna which in any case was already practically independent of the Empire. A fleet that he himself prepared for that purpose and sent to Rome was sunk in a storm in one of his worst defeats.
He managed to convince a significant part of his people of his religious ideas and made himself a natural leader for those who believed in him. He provoked endless theological debates and discussions, the records of most of which were lost when the Orthodox destroyed all iconoclastic documents after their final victory.
Under Leo III, state policy was always present in every act of the life of the Empire and there was none to gainsay it; with this the Empire once again regained its lost strength.
He never believed in grandiose projects of omnipotent and expansionist imperialism. He simply dedicated himself to achieving the possible and that was the secret of his success.
Finally, one must say that he was twice unjustly forgotten by history, first by the inhabitants of the Empire themselves who, once iconodulia was victorious, dedicated themselves to destroying documents and everything else referring to the iconoclasm that Leo founded and upheld, and later by historians, his name buried for centuries as a member of that elite group of great emperors of the Byzantine Empire.
Theophilus
Theophilus was a cultivated and refined person with a great knowledge of science and especially of the Arab world, of which he was a fervent admirer, influenced in particular by the inimitable Baghdad of that era.
His mentor was John the Grammarian, who inculcated in him a love for Arab art and a loathing for icons.
For this reason, during his reign he returned very strongly to iconoclasm and Arab influence extended itself throughout the Empire.
He wanted to establish a reputation as a wise and just leader and for that reason would stroll through Constantinople, talk with people on the street, listen to their complaints and dole out exemplary punishment to those whom he declared guilty, without regard to their social standing.
Administratively, he worked intelligently in creating new themes in the Empire’s far East, including Paphlagonia, Chaldea and most particularly, Cherson, on the distant Crimean Peninsula.
Additionally he created new border outposts on the eastern frontiers of his domain bordering on the Caliphate.
He had great problems with this neighboring state, and in fact the two remained in a permanent state of war. Occasionally the Emperor celebrated victories but many times his armies were defeated. It was an era when the power of Islam was still greatly to be feared, as was shown in a clash close to Darimon in 838.
The Emperor’s most difficult moment was when the Caliphate took the city of Amorium, an Anatolian fortress that the Byzantines had considered unconquerable and, what is worse, the Emperor’s own dynastic city of origin, which had pleaded desperately but vainly for help from Venice and the Franks.
Over time a number of legends have emerged about Theophilus due to his educated and inquiring personality as well as his wish to create an aura of justice around himself, all of which makes him a character of more than average interest.
The second iconoclastic period that ended with his death in 842 had been limited to certain sectors of Constantinople and that only by will of the Emperor, since most of the Empire had long since returned to Orthodox religious practices.
One cannot say that he was a great emperor, because as well as losing territories to the Arabs in the East he also lost part of Sicily in the West. But we can affirm that he was a good head of state who organized the State more efficiently and who favored the development of the arts and sciences. He was poorly remembered by his contemporaries and by later generations, just as were greater emperors like Leo III and Constantine V, solely because of his religious convictions. We must not forget that later history was written by Orthodox supporters of images, who also destroyed all iconoclastic documents and art.
Constantine VII (913-959, ruled 944-959)
In the year 958 when Basil II was born Byzantium was ruled by Constantine VII Porfirogenitus, who promoted education, literature and culture as no other emperor had done before him. He also encouraged the exchange of embassies as part of his foreign policy, as for example with the Umayyad Caliph Abdul Rahaman III, with Otto the Great, and with Princess Olga of Russia.
He was cautious but firm in the wars that he waged (or rather, that his generals began), even though in the case of Crete, which since being conquered by the Arabs was a thorn in the side of the entire Mediterranean, the expedition was a total failure due to a shortage of troops. However, this was balanced with the later taking of Theodosiopolis in the far East.
During these years two generals began to distinguish themselves by winning significant victories over the Arabs: Nicephorus Phocas, who led the army, and John Tzimisces, who in 958 took Samosata in northern Mesopotamia after a fierce battle.
Romanus II (959-963)
On 9 November, 959 Constantine VII died and his son Romanus II was consecrated emperor. He was an adolescent who was totally dominated by the woman who in 956 would become his wife, Theophano (her real name was Anastaso), a beautiful commoner with whom the young Romanus had fallen madly in love. The couple had their first son, Basil II, in 958.
The reign of Romanus II was notable mainly for the maneuvering of Joseph Bringas, the eunuch Parakoimomenos (a sort of Majordomo of the Palace) who advised the weak and love-sick Romanus II, as well as for the battles won by Nicephorus Phocas, the best-known general of the age who won great fame by his reconquest of Crete and then Germanicea, Anazarbos, Raban, and Duluk. In 962 he totally defeated Saif ad-Daulah in Aleppo.
Nicephorus Phocas (963-969).
On March 15, 963 Romanus II died while still very young. His wife Theophano, who began to reign as regent for her two sons, Basil II, barely five years old, and Constantine VIII, his younger brother, was aware of her precarious situation and joined in a plot with the great general Nicephorus Phocas, who had been crowned emperor by his troops in Caesarea and who usurped power on 14 August, 963, fighting against the soldiers of Joseph Bringas in the streets of a shocked Constantinople.
Theophano showed her astuteness by offering her hand to Phocas, thus legitimizing his power by uniting him by marriage to the Macedonian dynasty and transforming the veteran general-turned-emperor into the protector of the two young princes.
Here it is necessary to clarify that the Parakoimomenoi, or Majordomos of the Palace, had by this time gained a great deal of power in the State, transforming themselves into the advisors of weak emperors or of soldier-emperors who had spent far more time on the battlefield than in the Imperial Palace. These emperors would make all their decisions based on their Majordomo’s advice, a situation which had a decisive effect on the political processes of the Empire.
For this reason it is very important to note that following Joseph Bringas’ fall from grace, brought about by the quick and crafty actions of Theophano in making and breaking alliances, the eunuch Basil was named the new Parakoimomenos. He was the illegitimate son of Romanus Lecapenus, co-emperor (in reality, the “true” emperor) with Constantine VII from 920 to 944.
This Basil, who had already possessed broad influence in the court ever since the time of Constantine VII, would play a very important role in the reigns of Nicephorus Phocas, John Tzimisces and Basil II, and would also receive the newly-created title of Proedros, the Emperor’s right hand man.
John Tzimisces, member of an aristocratic family from Armenia, was named Domestikos of the East (boasting supreme command) and Leo Phocas, brother of the Emperor, was Domestikos of the West.
By this method a legitimate government was assembled for a usurper who emerged from one of the most famous aristocratic families of the entire Empire, and who nonetheless ended up winning more glory for Byzantium. The new emperor was motivated by religious fervor and such a love for Byzantium as rarely had been seen before, which led him to fight against Islam in an extraordinary way. He was able to unite all these elements to his own natural talent for war and that of his principal military comrades-in-arms, John Tzimisces and Leo Phocas, as mentioned above.
He conquered Tarsus and Mopsuestia en 965, invaded and retook Cyprus, and in 969 his army under the command of Peter Phocas and Michael Burtzes retook Antioch. Later on, Aleppo returned to the Byzantine orbit when its Emir was defeated and forced to pay a heavy tribute.
As we can see, his major accomplishment was the Byzantine reconquest of Cicilia and most of Syria.
Political problems with the West were the order of the day. Otto I had conquered almost all of Italy including Rome and shared the ancient ambition of one day being recognized as the sole emperor and heir to the Roman throne.
Nicephorus, basking in the glow of power and victory, expressed his disgust at the attitude of a “barbarian king” who wanted to give his son in marriage to the daughter of an Emperor. He treated the King’s embassy, led by Liutiprand of Cremona, as little more than impoverished prisoners, which in turn gave the ambassador the opportunity to rancorously and scornfully describe the figure of the Byzantine Emperor.
The Bulgars were also gravely mistaken about the Emperor. Nicephorus ordered the ambassadors of that county to be whipped when they demanded payment of a tribute agreed upon long years ago.
However, Nicephorus Phocas very wisely refused to be distracted from his campaigns in the East and he offered Sviatoslav, a Russian prince, a reward for fighting against the Bulgars and teaching them a lesson.
The Russian prince took full advantage of the opportunity to extend his dominions south of the Danube. In 969 he defeated the Bulgars and became a powerful force and by threatening Byzantium showed that Phocas had erred in calling him in to help the Empire. This was an error that was further compounded by the Byzantine policy in the first half of the 10th century of preferring the Russians to their own historic allies, the Khazars, who ultimately disappeared under Slavic rule.
This dark shadow in the Balkans was a major problem that the Emperor either could not or would not foresee.
The Emperor also fell victim to the brilliance of thought and alliances of Theophano, who took advantage of the fact that in spite of his victories, Nicephorus Phocas never achieved a great degree of popularity. This was because his tax increases and his long and hard-fought wars made ordinary citizens’ lives much hasher. Theophano finally drew John Tzimisces, who had become her lover, into a pact to eliminate the Emperor.
Thus it was that on the night of 10 December, 969 John Tzimisces and some of his soldiers entered the Emperor’s bedroom, surprising him in his sleep and assassinating him in one of the most unjust acts in the long history of Byzantium.
JOHN TZIMISCES. (969-976)
Without any doubt, John Tzimisces was the best Byzantine general of the 10th century and one of the most brilliant in the history of the Empire.
John Tzimisces, who came from an aristocratic family of Armenia, was named “Domestikos” of the East during the rule of Nicephorus Phocas and distinguished himself as a brilliant general who maintained the highest standard of honesty while collaborating with the seasoned general-emperor.
However, it was at this point that Theophano’s influence over the Byzantine imperial court came to an end, as a direct result of the decision of the Patriarch, Polyeuctes, who had become indignant at the murder of Phocas. He made it clear that he had decided to make the conspirators pay a high price. Before crowning Tzimisces as emperor he demanded that those responsible for the murder be punished and that Theophano be exiled. He also demanded the repeal of laws enacted by Phocas to limit monastic property.
John Tzimisces led Byzantium as emperor and protector of Basil II and Constantine VIII and showed the same energy as his predecessor whom he ultimately surpassed both as a general and as a ruler.
This was proven when he was able to peacefully resolve the conflict with Sviatoslov, who had allied himself with the Bulgars against Byzantium and demanded the Empire’s retreat.
Tzimisces put the Bulgars in their place after placing the dethroned Czar, whom he had captured, back on the throne. In 971 he took Grand Preslav and besieged Sviatoslav in Silistria, squeezing it between the army and the navy with its fearsome Greek fire. He wore down its defenders until Sviatoslav surrendered and then made the Russian prince promise to abandon Bulgaria. However, this promise was never fulfilled because the Russian ruler met his death at the hands of the Pechenegs before he could return to his own country.
Thus, the Emperor annexed eastern Bulgaria to Byzantine territory, eliminating the special peril posed by the Russians.
Politically, Tzimisces was more cautious and possessed better foresight than Phocas. He also proved himself to be much more diplomatic, as was demonstrated by the solution he found in giving a young woman of his own family in marriage to Otto I, thus establishing peace and stability with the West.
As a military leader he was truly brilliant and in the East, his principal interest, he conquered Antioch in 974 and in 975 the cities of Emesa, Baalbek, Damascus, Tiberias, Nazareth, Acre and Caesarea.
Nonetheless, his real ambition was that of reconquering all the lands that had been lost to the Arabs in the 8th century. However, this could not to be brought to fruition and the effort was cut short by his death on 10 January, 976.
It is not known for certain how John Tzimisces’ life came to an end. Some authors such as Ostrogorsky are of the opinion that he died of an illness, possibly typhus. Maier and Treadgold were uncertain whether it was a case of typhus or a conspiracy driven by the Proedros Basil, most likely a very opportune poisoning which would certainly place total power into the hands of the already over-powerful Majordomo of the Palace.
Whatever caused it, the Emperor’s untimely death was certainly cause for celebration on the part of all the Empire’s enemies, including the Fatimids, the Bulgars and other neighboring peoples.
BASIL II
The Proedros, Basil, and Bardas Skleros’ rebellion.

The sudden death of John Tzimisces gave a number of famous generals cause to reconsider their possibilities of becoming Emperor, generating an atmosphere of great tension within the Empire.

In the year 976 Basil II was eighteen years old and Constantine VII was sixteen. Both had been raised as frivolous, useless and decorative members of a sumptuous imperial court that rendered homage to whoever was the strongman of the moment. Nobody imagined that the heirs to the throne would actually step forward to claim it that very year.

Nonetheless, their great uncle, the eunuch Basil, who boasted great power in the palace, was able to take power in the name of the two young heirs.

It was at this point that we see the emergence of a powerful warrior: Bardas Skleros, John Tzimisces’ Domestikos of the East and member of one of the oldest and richest families of Byzantium, was proclaimed Emperor by his troops in the summer of 976.

Basil, who was running the Empire as the de facto emperor, began in 977 to unsuccessfully send troops against Bardas Skleros. Skleros’ rebellion soon gained control of all of Asia Minor, took Nicea in 978 and was drawing nearer to the capital.

Desperate after Skleros’ victories, Basil resorted to his only remaining way out: he called on a general, Bardas Phocas, brother in law of Nicephorus, who had tried unsuccessfully to usurp power during the government of Tzimiscs but whose putsch had been quashed by the then-emperor’s defender, Bardas Skleros.

Bardas Phocas was a fearsome warrior of great stature as well as an excellent general who would not turn down a chance to avenge past grievances. In a very daring plan, he would avoid direct confrontation when Skleros was close to Constantinople but would move on Caesarea instead, forcing the usurper to pursue him. Skleros emerged as clear victor in the initial clashes and later in more important battles he was also victorious. However, in the decisive battle which took place very close to Amorium on the plains of Pancalea, Phocas, who had very cunningly held back his best fresh forces and whose morale was very high, inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebel forces on 29 May, 979, putting an end to three years of civil war which had sapped the power of Byzantium.

Thus it was that Bardas Skleros, defeated and humiliated by Bardas Phocas, was forced to flee and to seek asylum in the court of the Caliph al-Ta’i.

For his part, the victorious general Bardas Phocas soon had a confrontation with the Parakoimomenos Basil, as a result of which he was marginalized for several years.

The Uprising in Macedonia

Due to the death of John Tzimisces and taking advantage of the civil war declared by Bardas Skleros which occupied the attention of the armies of Byzantium for several years, Macedonia experienced a large-scale uprising which eventually took on the characteristics of a war of liberation against the Empire.

So it was that in 976 when the great warrior emperor was dead and Byzantium was distracted with one of its frequent struggles for power the entire region of Macedonia was gripped by the Cometopouloi uprising, which resulted in the foundation of a new Empire, the Macedonian Bulgar Empire.

The dethroned Czar Boris, who had been a prisoner in Constantinople ever since John Tzimisces deftly used him against Sviatoslav and then let him drop, learned of this insurrection and fled the Byzantine capital with his brother Romanus, heading for his homeland.

Here one of those unique events took place that history capriciously throws up against its protagonists: when Boris crossed the border the Bulgar soldiers mistook his identity and he died at the hands of his own subjects.

Romanus could not be crowned Czar because the Byzantines had castrated him, and being an “incomplete man” he could not take command of the new empire.

This left Samuel, who took command from this moment on and later on took the crown of Czar of the Macedonian Empire.

Samuel was the creator of a great new empire which had its main capital at Prespa and later at Ochrida and which was able to win control of all the territory it claimed as its own, including all of Bulgaria, Thessaly, Epirius, the zone of Dirrachium, Rascia and Dioclea, stopping only outside of the city of Thessalonica, which defended itself valiantly and was not conquered.

Samuel very wisely declared the New Bulgarian Empire as the continuation of the empire of Simeon and of Peter. The imperial institutions and the patriarchate followed the traditions of the earlier empire, with the difference that the region of Macedonia was its center and its empire was larger and more powerful than that of Simeon

The true character of Basil II

From 976 until 979 the government of Basil, the palace eunuch, was very weak and subject to pressures of all sorts while being unable to overcome Bardas Skleros.

With Phocas’ victory, the eunuch Basil’s power was reaffirmed and he governed at his own whim, dictating laws and decisions and enriching himself enormously, transforming himself into the richest and most powerful figure in all the Byzantine state.

In the face of this situation Basil II, who had remained a decorative figure and who owed his very throne to the great eunuch, drew ever further apart from his great uncle.

Showing his true personal character, Basil II wanted to govern and was eager to take power into his own hands, which led him to attempt, first subtly and then more openly, to distance himself from his “benefactor” who stood behind the throne.

Little by little the eunuch Basil saw how Basil II tried to decide on questions of government, no longer docile and manageable, now discussing everything and creating problems for his once-omnipotent uncle.

In the face of this situation, in the year 985 when Basil II was 27 years old, the grand eunuch of the palace planned a conspiracy together with Bardas Phocas, his old savior, and other generals. However, in a brilliant preemptive strike that showed his ability and intelligence Basil II had his uncle arrested, confiscated his incalculable fortune and sent him into exile.

Not long afterward, the man who had since 963 been the most powerful figure in Byzantium died abandoned, alone and without a coin to his name. He who had spent twenty-two years on top of the world died sadly and in the most utter solitude.

The one who was responsible for this, Emperor Basil II, began thus his long, difficult yet prosperous reign.

Basil II, the Lonely Emperor (985-1025)

First Campaign against the Bulgarian Empire.

The first measure that Basil II took upon gaining sole power was to declare null and void all the laws that had been promulgated by the eunuch Basil. One may conjecture that the young Basil, who owed his possession of the throne to his great uncle, had nourished a great deal of resentment against him, perhaps because he, the legitimate Emperor, could not even participate in decision-making, perhaps due to simple envy of the power that the grand eunuch wielded. The young Emperor kept in force only those laws that he himself wished to reaffirm.

The situation of the Empire was no longer the same as at the end of the reign of John Tzimisces, who had earned the respect and fear of all the neighboring states.

Bardas Skleros’ attempted usurpation of power and the civil war it produced had weakened Byzantium’s position with regard to its neighbors, bringing as a grave consequence the creation of the Macedonian Bulgar Empire of Czar Samuel.

It was very logical that Basil’s first campaign sought to return some semblance of normalcy to the territory of the Balkans, given that the Bulgarian Empire headed by Czar Samuel had become a fearsome adversary and a potential invader of new Byzantine territories.

It was Samuel’s invasion of Thessaly and takeover of Larissa in late 985 that made Basil II decide to go on the offensive.

Basil II determined to take Sardica (Sofia) by surprise, but although he dedicated no small number of troops to the operation he could not penetrate the city and short of supplies, he decided to return before his casualties became excessive. Unfortunately for the Byzantine emperor, as his army was retreating it was attacked by Bulgarian Czar’s army which inflicted a grave defeat in August, 986, seriously endangering Basil’s power and reputation within the Empire.

Attempted Usurpation in Byzantium.

In Byzantium the Emperor’s defeats were usually not received very well, being considered proof that the ruler either did not enjoy the favor of God or was at very best incompetent, and this incident was no exception.

Bardas Skleros reappeared in the empire and had himself proclaimed emperor by the troops he had recruited.

For his part, Bardas Phocas was still resentful at the disgraceful treatment he had received at the hands of the Parakoimomenos Basil when he was in power. Thus when he was called upon to once again confront insurrection as supreme commander in Asia, even though at first he seemed to accept the responsibility, he then had himself proclaimed emperor on 15 August, 987, before the image of his great uncle, Nicephorus Phocas.

All the generals of the army and all the most important families of Asia Minor (with the obvious exception of the Skleros) supported Phocas, giving his rebellion the characteristics of a general uprising against the young, autocratic and pretentious Basil II, who had virtually no allies anywhere in the Empire.

And, if this were not bad enough news for the Emperor, Phocas and Skleros came to an agreement to divide the Empire between them: Phocas in Europe with the capital, and Skleros in Asia.

However, this alliance was very short-lived and Phocas, conscious of the massive support that he enjoyed, imprisoned Skleros and became the only pretender to the throne.

With all of Asia Minor on his side, in early 998 he drew dangerously close to Constantinople, taking two positions to attack the city: Abydos and Chrysopolis, preparing to attack both by land and by sea.

Basil II lost no time. He knew that within the Empire he enjoyed very little support so instead he called on Prince Vladimir of Kiev, who sent him a contingent of six thousand men, the famous Varego-Russian Druzhina, formed of Russian Normans.

The Emperor himself, fearless and brave, led his Russian-Byzantine army to its destiny at the end of 988: Chrysopolis.

Basil II’s victory was overwhelming and was to be repeated at Abydos on 13 April, 989, where Phocas was not only defeated but died, apparently from a heart attack.

Bardas Skleros, who had still not learned his lesson, rose up once again but finally arrived at a peaceful accord, ending up as a loyal subject of the Emperor.

In exchange for his help, Basil II’s pact granted Prince Vladimir the Emperor’s sister Ana Porfirogeneta’s hand in marriage, something that was an incomparable privilege in that era.

So important for the Byzantines was the giving in marriage of a princess of the imperial dynasty that when he thought the promise would not be fulfilled, Vladimir invaded Cherson in 989 in order to enforce his rights. Of course, the marriage finally took place.

The condition imposed by the Byzantines for the marriage of their princess to Vladimir was far more important: the Christianization of the Russian state.

Thus, Basil II achieved almost without seeking it the Christianization of the most important of the Slav states, placing it under the leadership of Constantinople. Russia began its journey toward Orthodoxy, which marked the centuries-long influence of Byzantium over the Russian state.

Basil II, the Autocrat.

As a child Basil II was raised as a drone in the imperial court, living a pleasant and easy life that assured successive Palace Majordomos their supremacy and their own governance of the Byzantine state.

The tutelage of his great uncle, the eunuch Basil, made the young heir into an emperor ruling in the shadow of greater powers; what was expected of Basil was the attitude of his brother, Constantine VIII, who remained content with his life of luxury and frivolity.

However, in spite of all this Basil II was made of stronger stuff, although none realized it until he surprised his uncle by exiling him and confiscating all his goods.

Then the betrayals by his own generals, the uprisings, the implacable enemies, all little by little made him withdraw from all those who surrounded him. He became more difficult to meet, preferring to be alone, to decide alone, to rule alone as a true and authentic autocrat.

He had not married up to this point, and he decided never to do so. He had nobody in whom he could place his trust and his behavior was very odd in the Byzantine court where everyone wished to excel in the art of rhetoric or in knowledge of arts and sciences. However, the Emperor barely spoke to anyone (only as much as necessary), and did not discuss affairs of state. He did not bother to convince anyone of what he had decided; he simply put it into practice.

His very raison d’être was the Byzantine state, its survival and progress and the defeat of its enemies.

Measures against the Landed Gentry and the Monasteries.

In order for the State to grow it was necessary to rein in the aristocratic class of rich landholding families who with their unlimited ambitions were accumulating lands that the free peasants sold cheaply for various reasons (droughts, bad harvests, floods, fires, etc.).

Aware of the crucial importance of the free peasantry, Basil II collected the laws that were promulgated by Romanus Lecapenus to protect the peasants and even improved them in order to return lost land to the peasants.

His agrarian policy was thus deeply anti-aristocratic, which earned him the hatred of all the important families of the Themes.

It was with this spirit that he made the great magnates like the Phocas and Maleinoi families return all the lands that they had usurped illegally from their legitimate owners ever since the first agrarian law of Romanus Lecapenus was enacted in 922. Basil’s Novel of 996 names these families specifically.

In this Novel, the Phocas and the Maleinoi are held up as examples of aristocratic families who had gained unlimited power by illegally acquiring land, buying it from owners who had fallen onto hard times due to frost, fire or excessive taxes, in contravention of existing laws that protected small landholders, and then taking advantage of a forty-year statute of limitations after which no challenge could be made against illegally-acquired land titles.

Following reasonable logic, the Novel specified that due to their growing power the great landlords could easily run out the statute of limitations and gain clear title to the land. Thus the statute of limitations was abolished, returning to the status quo antes of 922 when Romanus Lecapenus decreed his first Novel on this subject.

As a consequence, great landlords who had acquired lands illegally since 922 had to return them to their former owners without any recourse to the statute of limitations.

The measure, which was almost impossible to enforce (more than 74 years had passed), showed the hatred that Basil II felt toward the rural aristocracy of Asia Minor that had caused him such problems and challenges with their revolts since the beginning of his reign, and had caused him to waste a great deal of time, offering Czar Samuel the opportunity to organize a true rival empire in the Balkans.

This Novel also affected the monasteries, which had become immensely wealthy thanks to ever growing donations made by the subjects of the Empire, including wills which left goods and property to the church.

At that time a huge number of monasteries had been established in villages or hamlets where peasants had donated their lands. In his Novel of 996 Basil II declared that these were not monasteries but rather Houses of Prayer under the control of the local hamlet, owing no monetary obligations to the bishop.

The larger monasteries, defined as those having more than eight monks, remained under the jurisdiction of the local bishop but were denied the right to acquire more land, once again in agreement with the old laws of Romanus Lecapenus.

The “Allenlengyon.”

The “allenlengyon” system was a method of tax collection that had produced very good results for the Empire ever since the times of Nicephorus I. It meant that each rural village was subject to a certain total amount of taxes that the State collected in the following way: if a neighbor proved himself to be insolvent (which occurred fairly frequently because of the various problems that might cause a bad harvest) the remaining villagers were responsible for paying his taxes. This insured collection of the total amount of taxes budgeted for that village.

Basil II’s greatest worry was that in his time the peasants were being victimized by this system because if a peasant abandoned his parcel of land the neighbors would pay his taxes. However, those who could not bear this increased tax burden then often found it necessary to leave as well, leaving great extents of land abandoned to the rich and powerful who could then acquire title at minimal expense.

In this situation the State collected less and less taxes as well as suffering the abandonment of entire villages.

In a very brilliant move Basil II decided that from now on only the great landholders would be responsible for the payment of taxes for the insolvent. This killed two birds with one stone: the state was assured payment of taxes and agricultural and livestock production was maintained.

Of course the protests were loud and angry and great figures made their voices heard, supported by Patriarch Sergius, but by this time Basil II was already a strong, intelligent and inflexible monarch and he did not waver in applying the new rules.

Europe over Asia.

Bardas Skleros’ uprising had certainly left its mark on the mind of Basil II, along with Bardas Phocas’ betrayal. The Emperor was also impressed by the great power of Eustacius Malenios, a magnate who occasionally received the Emperor at his estate and took the opportunity to show him how the people lived.

These three figures had one thing in common: they represented the rural landed gentry of Asia Minor. Their lands were in Anatolia, Armenia or Cappadocia, where in many cases their landholdings bordered on the western Islamic territories. This landed nobility had dominated the life of the Empire in recent years under the rule of Nicephorus Phocas and John Tzimisces.

These landowners held that the interests of the Empire ought to lie in reconquering lands lost to the Arabs, which appeared eminently logical to them given their own interest in increasing control of territories close to those that they already owned. However, Basil not only fought them by charging them the taxes of the destitute peasants and making them return lands seized more than seventy years ago, but occasionally even (as in the case of Eustacius Malenios) confiscated all their belongings. And, he favored war against the Bulgarian Empire of Samuel (totally confined to European territory) over the reconquest of territories from Islam. Unfortunately, the latter would have actually been much more advantageous because Fatimid Egypt, which controlled Syria and Palestine, was passing through an era of significant weakness, as John Tzimisces had demonstrated with his remarkable campaigns.

Basil II, the Soldier.

The Bulgarian Empire: the Great Obsession.

Thus we have an emperor with several lifelong obsessions: limiting the power of the nobility in Asia Minor, limiting the power of the Church, and winning a predominantly European empire, which in turn required the defeat of his great rival, the intelligent, astute and powerful Czar Samuel who had torn from Byzantium a large part of its European empire.

As to the rural aristocracy and the church, nobody could suggest that Basil II wanted to destroy them. He simply could not bear the thought that there might be families who were more powerful than the Emperor himself, or that the power of the church could be greater than that of the State.

With an intelligence that dwarfed others of his time, the Byzantine sovereign understood that if business went on as usual as it had under his predecessors the State would inevitably end up disintegrating into petty feudal estates like the one already held by Eustacius Maleinos. When visiting him after a campaign against Syria the Emperor came to realize that Malenios controlled thousands of slaves and serfs and that if he had wished to he could have easily formed his own army. He also knew that the monasteries owned whole villages that paid no taxes to the State, only contributions to the bishop, which made the church even more powerful.

However, the principal goal that the Emperor had set for himself was to conquer the empire of Samuel, and he would not rest until achieving total victory. Perhaps his hatred toward the gentry of Asia Minor lent more importance to the war in Europe, or perhaps he felt humiliated by his first defeat when he was unable to enter Sardica. In any case, Samuel and his empire remained a thorn in the side of the Emperor, who dedicated all his strength, all his creativity and all his waking hours to the task of conquering his enemy.

Foreign Help and Complications in Antioch.

Certainly enthused with the brilliant success won with the help of the Varegan soldiers, the Emperor requested help from the Croat king, Stephen Drzhislav. In return he sent Stephen the royal insignia, named him Eparch of all the zone of the Dalmatian cities, and granted him the title of Patrician.

He also made contact with the Serbs, but when the delegation from the Slavic lands arrived in Constantinople in 992 they did not meet with the Emperor because he had already left on military campaign against the Bulgars.

Macedonia thus became the scene of a merciless war between Bulgaria and Byzantium. Both Samuel and Basil II knew that the future of their respective empires was at stake and they both put forth their best efforts to win victory battle by battle.

However, in 994 problems emerged with the Fatimids, which obliged the Emperor to return to Constantinople and then to march to the north of Syria where the city of Antioch was in danger and Aleppo was already occupied by the Arabs.

In 995 he arrived at Aleppo, taking the enemy by surprise and defeating them. He then took Rafanea and Edessa, showing an extraordinary talent and energy for war. However, war on two fronts means only bitterness, and the Empire suffered once again when Samuel took advantage of the respite that Basil II had given him and the Bulgarian advance reached the Peloponnesus.

Nonetheless, the Emperor had an excellent general in Nicephorus Uranos, who beat Samuel in a battle in 997 in which the Bulgarian Czar was gravely wounded.

Yet Samuel was also a talented military leader as well as a very strong man. He survived and recovered from his wounds and the next year took Dirrachium and then incorporated Rascia and Dioclea into his empire in late 998.

Meanwhile, Basil II fulfilled his obligation to give battle in the East where, in 999, he returned to Syria and once again defeated the Fatimids in Antioch, although he was unable to take Tripoli.

That same year he had to go to Armenia and Iberia to put down uprisings in these two nations.

As soon as he returned to Constantinople in 1001 he had to leave in haste for the Balkans to once again face his hated enemy.

Total War.

In 1001 Basil was finally able to concentrate all his military power in the area of the Balkans, since the Byzantine East was pacified and stable.

As direct and frontal as he usually was in war, his expedition headed for Sardica where he entered triumphantly and then proceeded to dominate the whole region, cutting Samuel’s empire in two and weakening it significantly from the beginning.

The Byzantines were also able to take Plishka, the former Bulgarian capital, as well as Great Preslav.

Their next step was to enter Macedonia where they took Berea and conquered Serbia.

Then they headed for Greece, to the region of Thessaly, conquered it without important opposition and then returned to Macedonia.

The taking of Vodena in Macedonia was a quite different case, requiring great efforts to besiege and conquer the city because of its great walls.

By now it was the year 1003, and after taking Vodena Basil headed for Vidin, a fortress on the Danube which he besieged with his army but which turned out to be very difficult to penetrate.

After besieging the Danubian city for several months he was surprised by Samuel, who took and sacked Adrianople by surprise.

The Emperor, nonetheless, did not take the bait. He refused to be distracted by what could turn out to be a trap laid by his intelligent adversary and he continued the fight for Vidin, which he was able to take after eight months of siege in 1004.

Immediately and without respite, Basil led his army toward the south where he encountered the army of Samuel on the banks of the River Vadar, very close to Skopje, and inflicted on him what turned out to be a decisive defeat in the course of the war.

Basil’s entry into Skopje was immediate, returning this city as well to the Byzantine orbit.

After four years of fierce combat Basil II had won victory after victory, had cut the Bulgarian Empire in two, had taken away their best cities, and half their territory was once again Byzantine.

Faced with this situation and certainly aware of his soldiers’ need for rest and recuperation, he decided to return to Constantinople to spend the winter a bit more comfortably and to prepare his forces to deal a final blow.

The Bulgaroctonos.

By 1004 Byzantium had the war practically won. This is shown, for example, by the betrayal of Dirrachium which went over the Byzantine side in 1005, knowing that Samuel’s side had no chance to win.

The war that was waged by the emperor was very far from that customarily carried out by previous Byzantine rulers, who would usually attack only during the warm seasons and would return to Constantinople for the winter, partly to maintain control of the always-unpredictable events of the imperial court and the nobility and partly to rest and recuperate in order to carry on again when the weather permitted.

Basil had no second thoughts about being four years on the battlefield, four full winters before returning, because he had drawn up a plan and he would not relent until it was accomplished. Possessed of an enviable degree of determination, he enjoyed a prodigious intelligence that allowed him to take the enemy apart at the most vital points, along with an incomparable energy that was daunted neither by Samuel’s brightest stratagems nor by his knowledge of the terrain, nor by the diversionary tactics that the Bulgarian Czar employed with great skill and the greatest daring.

Beyond any doubt, the Byzantine army was superior to the Bulgarian army in order, discipline and technique; additionally, the mobility that it was given by its commanders was a fundamental factor and its maneuvers were fast and always unpredictable. The Byzantine siege tactics against the most important fortified centers, plus the high moral of its soldiers who were ready and willing to follow their leader as far as he wished to go were all decisive factors in this war.

The next ten years of the war found Samuel holding out in several different zones that he more or less dominated, but his empire was by now nothing but a memory. His resistance, based on a high degree of mobility and constant skirmishes, did not lead to any great battles until the year 1014 when in July the Byzantine army pinned him down in a mountain pass in the Clidion chain in the region of Strymon.

There, Samuel’s army was slaughtered by the Byzantines, although Samuel himself was able to make a desperate escape to Prilep, which was still under his control.

Basil II, now surer than ever of his final victory, had a true attack of cruelty, perhaps motivated by the delay in ending a war that had cost him the better part of his life. He ordered the vast number of Bulgar prisoners (according to Skylitzes, 15,000; according to Kekaumenos, 14,000, although both these figures may be a bit exaggerated) to be blinded, all except one man out of every hundred who could serve as a guide to lead the rest to Prilep.

This cruelty was Basil’s final stroke in a war that had now been running in his favor for a long time, and it confirmed the nickname that the Emperor had earned some time before: the Bulgar-killer, the Bulgaroctonos.

Samuel, who was a great soldier but who had no other option but to resist the Emperor as well as he could for so many years, surely loved the Bulgars; when he saw the blind battalions staggering into Prilep he fainted and fell to the ground senseless.

Two days later the great Bulgarian Czar died, on 6 October, 1014.

Nonetheless, his successors were dedicated to carrying on the war. His son Gabriel Radomir fell victim, along with his wife and his brother-in-law John Vladimir, to an assassination plot that cost him his life in 1015. The instigator of the assassination, his cousin John Vladislav, had himself crowned Czar and continued the hostilities.

Bit by bit the Byzantine army was taking control of the territory that Vladislav still dominated and his death during an attempted attack against Dirrachium marked the final end of the war.

An Incomparable Conqueror.

By 1018 the Emperor had fulfilled his purpose in life. At seventy years of age he could say that his life’s goal was accomplished: he had overcome the Bulgarian Empire and had utterly defeated it.

His entrance into Ochrida was extraordinary. There he received the homage of those he had conquered, the Czarina and the rest of the Bulgarian imperial family.

Basil II then dedicated himself for a time to touring all of Macedonia and the lands south of the Danube, making it totally clear that he was the highest and unquestioned authority in the conquered territory.

And, this was really an absolutely invaluable conquest, something that no other emperor had achieved in Byzantium since the times of Justinian when the Slavic invasions had begun over four centuries before. All of the Balkan Peninsula was once again Byzantine territory.

Of comparable importance was the fact that Byzantine influence now extended to Dioclea, Bosnia and even Croatia, all of which functioned as vassal states, with their own princes but following the policies of the Empire.

At this point the European part of the Empire was truly impressive, its domains were firm and respected, the army was at its most important point since Justinian, the Byzantine Emperor was admired in his territories and beyond, and conditions were ripe for an even greater expansion.

The Situation in Bulgaria.

The Emperor was very considerate regarding the situation of the conquered nation, almost as though he wished to apologize for the violence and cruelty that he had unleashed during the war.

First of all, regarding the tributes that the Bulgar people had to pay, he allowed them to pay in kind, something that greatly alleviated the suffering of the country which had been devastated by war for so many long years.

Here one must remember that in all of the Empire taxes were paid in cash and the circulation of Byzantine coinage was vital to the economy of the Empire as well as that of the then-known world.

Then, on the question of religion, Basil II continue to show the superiority of his reasoning over that of his subjects: he reduced the rank of the Patriarchate of Ochrida to that of an Archbishopric, which at first glance seemed to be a demotion. However, in exchange he granted it independence from Constantinople, a decision which was received with great satisfaction by the Bulgar clergy. Finally, the Emperor reserved for himself the privilege of naming the Archbishop.

With these measures Basil II kept control of the Bulgar church in the hands of the Emperor himself, keeping the church of Constantinople from growing in power and at the same time earning the gratitude of the Slavic nation’s clergy.

Finally, in the political arena Bulgaria (as we must recall, Macedonian Bulgaria) became a Byzantine theme, with Skopje as its capital.

This theme was named a “Catepanate” and then a Duchy, which showed the emperor’s degree of concern, given that this lent more importance to the territory.

Silistria became the capital of the theme of Paristrion, south of the Danube, which would also be a Catepanate and then a Duchy.

Sirmium would also head a theme south of the Danube in its northwestern part.

The theme of Dalmatia was confirmed with its administrative center at Zara.

Then came the Duchy of Dirrachium, the most important city facing the Adriatic Sea, and the theme of Thessalonica, the second most important city in the Empire after Constantinople, which was also raised to the dignity of a Duchy

Finally, there were the regions of Dioclea, Trevinia, Zachlumia, Rascia, Bosnia and Croatia, which were not themes but as noted above were vassal status of the Empire, each with its own ruler.

Thus Basil organized the enormous territory that now totally dominated a Byzantine Empire whose center of gravity had shifted significantly toward the European part of the Empire.

The East Once More

In 1020 Gagik I, the king who had ruled the destiny of Armenia ever since 990, died. A period of unrest followed in that eastern country, offering Basil II the opportunity to intervene. Vaspurkan and Iberia were incorporated into the Byzantine Empire, which kept on accumulating power, this time in the distant East.

The Armenian kingdom of Ani would pass into Byzantine hands on the death of John Smbat, its king, according to an agreement that had been established by the Emperor.

The themes of Asia Minor continued to be favored by the Emperor to the detriment of the new border themes; Antioch became a Duchy and Mesopotamia as well. Then Edessa, Vaspurkan and Iberia were named Catepanates, which also raised their status above the themes of the regions of Anatolia and Cappadocia.

Thus was organized the Byzantine far East, giving preponderance to the territories conquered by Phocas, Tzimisces, and Basil II over the themes where the aristocracy had its own bulwark.

The West as Well.

As though this work of conquest was not enough, the Emperor also planned the reconquest of the territories of the island of Sicily, where there were still living memories of Byzantine rule.

Prior to this, a Catepanate had been formed of all the remaining Byzantine domains in the south of the Italian peninsula, which gave greater cohesion to the administration of the territory. Basil Boioanes was the Catepan who had made southern Italy strong, taking advantage as well of Byzantine influence in the Western imperial court, whose emperor, Otto III was the son of Theophano, the young female relative of John Tzimisces who had been given in marriage to Otto II, his father.

The immediate plan was to take advantage of the strength of the Catepanate of Italy in order to invade Sicily and for this purpose Basil made lengthy preparations, taking full advantage of the stabilization of his other borders. However, on 15 December 1025 the great emperor died at the age of 67 years.

Unfortunately, Basil II did not live to put his plan into action, but his work in favor of the Empire was invaluable.

The Errors of a Great Emperor.

Beyond a doubt, Basil II was one of the greatest emperors in all the history of Byzantium, and one of the most distinguished personalities of medieval Europe in the 10th and 11th centuries, but this does not mean that either his personality or his dedicated work at the head of the Empire were infallible.

In principle, his thoroughly autocratic government, based on the cult of his own personality, could not do other than leave an vacuum of people with real values who could succeed him at the head of the army or of the Empire itself.

It is logical to conclude that if for forty years the army was under the command of a single person to the exclusion of all others, one whose orders were obeyed as though he were a god, at his death there would be no one with so much as a minimum degree of aptitude to succeed him, being that all who worked under his unquestioned and very personal orders and decisions had no option but to obey or die.

Of course there were distinguished generals who fought for him, but always under the shadow of his authority which allowed these generals to establish neither a minimum degree of popularity nor personalities of their own.

The very monumental authority that the Emperor held in life engendered after his death a power-vacuum that would barely be filled in the future by a couple of generals who, being good soldiers, lost their posts due to the intrigues of the Byzantine court, showing that their power was limited in spite of their military talent.

The Succession.

Precisely the same thing that happened with the army occurred in the imperial court: at the time of Basil II’s death in 1025 there was not a single figure with even the slightest aptitude to succeed him, at least not at the court, among his family members or associates.

Constantine VIII was now more than 70 years old. Even though he had accompanied his brother in some of his campaigns, even though he was always present at court, even though he was always associated with the throne, he did not have much personal interest in managing the destiny of the Empire.

The figure of the recently deceased Emperor was, in 1025, absolutely irreplaceable. Even worse, there was not a single member of the Macedonian dynasty who could even partially emulate him.

Why was it so important that the succession be passed to some more or less capable member of the ruling dynasty? It was because among the people of Byzantium the idea of succession via hereditary legitimacy had become so deeply rooted that it was impossible to accomplish by any other method.

If only the Emperor would have had sons the problem would have been less, but his brother and co-emperor Constantine VIII never fathered any male heirs either, only two daughters who were already adults in 1025. This would not impede one of them, Zoë, from marrying twice in order to “produce” several other emperors. She would adopt one son as well, which shows what degree of importance dynastic legitimacy held in the Empire.

And, it was the person of Basil II himself who had helped strengthen the popular concept of legitimacy by dynastic origin, even though ever since the era of Romanus Lecapenus and then the usurpers Nicephorus Phocas and John Tzimisces, regency or marriage was the only thing that could legitimate an emperor not born to the purple.

This was the great debt to the empire that Basil II left unpaid: failing to arrange a succession which would please the people and the nobility and would grant some sort of continuity to his government. The consequence was a slow but inexorable dismemberment of the Empire due to the unstoppable feudalization that emerged in later years from his failure to enforce the very that laws he himself had decreed. Nobody in power was particularly worried about maintaining and building upon his conquests or ordering the life of the citizens in the interests of the State.

This is no small debt, and stems from the Emperor’s utter lack of interest in the life of an imperial court that he openly scorned and viewed as superfluous.

Obviously, this is a great debt, but nonetheless does not take rob Basil II of the honor of being considered one of the greatest emperors of all time.

Alex I Comnene
Alex I was the third son of John Comnene as well as the son in law of the emperor Isaac I.
He took the throne from Nicephorus III.
He had military success against the Normans and the Pechenegs as well as strongly throwing back the Seleucid Turks who were exerting pressure on Anatolia following the Battle of Mantzikert (1071).
He was an energetic military man who belonged to one of the highest ranking families in Constantinople, that is to say, the military aristocracy, and he was a good emperor although his battles were defensive, with an empire under threat from every side.
He was also a good diplomat who successfully dealt with the leaders of the First Crusade, upon whom he imposed an oath of fidelity in spite of their profound contempt for him, especially the Norman barons.
He even arranged for them to conquer and return to him the crucially vital city of Nicea, which had been conquered a few years before by the Turks.
However, he was unable to accomplish the same goal with Antioch, which he was tricked out of by the Norman Bohemund.
According to some historians it was Alex I Comnene who asked the Pope for help to reconquer lost territories, but this refers to mercenary troops, not the highly problematic intervention of Western armies as was decided with the First Crusade.
Alex fought the financial bourgeoisie, which earned him many enemies. Nor did he get along well with the great merchants.
The Comneni
Out of the thousand years that the Byzantine Empire existed, it was governed for no less than one hundred years by three unequalled figures: Alex I, John II and Manuel I Comnene.
They were members of one of the empire’s richest families, and they brought Byzantium through hard times. Because the administration was disintegrating the whole foundation of the Empire was crumbling. Byzantine commerce was continuously shrinking due to the increasing ambition of the Italian maritime republics, taxes were being collected by the great landlords through the institution of the pronoia, a special concession that allowed them to collect tribute on their own lands, the army was becoming more and more dominated by contract mercenaries, the navy was disappearing, etc., etc.
Why did they do nothing to stop or at least slow this process? It was only logical in this world that was so different from that in which Basil II lived (even though I believe that the great Emperor could foresee this moment, which explains why he decreed the laws that he did) that the Emperor would be forced to “buy” loyalties even though thereby further enriching the Empire’s aristocrats and landed gentry. It was a political question; the Emperor was no longer truly in command, his power having been reduced to that of a mediator between members of the imperial court, the great rich and influential citizens.
Times had indeed changed. By 1081 the centrifugal forces that had been tearing the Empire apart had already prevailed and by the time Manuel died in 1180 all that remained was a hyper-fragmented shell that would do nothing but cause ever-increasing disunity and wars among the Greek landed gentry.
Only the powerful personalities of these three warlords themselves could hold the Empire together during those hundred years and for this reason even their greatest triumphs were short-lived.
It is very difficult to know if the Comneni would have been able to successfully oppose a process that was already accelerating when their government first began, but their constant wars, even though in most cases victorious, drained the state treasury. Meanwhile, most taxes went uncollected, trade and commerce generated profits only for the Italians. This was clearly the road to ruin.
These hundred years were, in my view, the Byzantines’ swan song. The rest of the story was one of death, resurrection, and then the sad though heroic final downfall.
History has dealt unfairly with these three soldier-emperors who, relying solely on their own strength, drive, diplomacy and intelligence were able to carry forward a once-great power like Byzantium which by that point had been pulverized into thousands of semi-feudal micro-states.
The reality is that the final years of the Macedonian dynasty must bear primary blame for this process of dismemberment, along with the anarchy subsequent to the disaster of Mantzikert (Manazgert for the Turks) which eventually descended into total chaos, the worst the Empire had seen since Heraclius.
Another factor that had to be dealt with and which brought with it enormous problems was that of the crusades: those mad Westerners whom the Byzantines did not understand because the idea of a crusade was utterly alien to the Byzantine mind. It was the crusaders who sacked whole villages in Imperial territory during the First Crusade in the times of Alex and again in the Second Crusade during the reign of Manuel. It was the crusaders who took over Antioch as though it was their perfect right to do so and who constantly schemed among themselves about how to get rid of the bothersome Comneni, to whom they owed an oath of loyalty in spite of hating them so deeply.
To understand more clearly one must realize that for a Byzantine the idea of soldier-monks (for example, the Templars) was totally insane. Either one was a monk or one was a soldier. And, the idea of naming fallen warriors as saints was deeply repugnant even though men like Tzimisces tried unsuccessfully to persuade the patriarchs to do the same with Byzantine soldiers.
The economic history of Byzantium is as interesting as its political history and in fact the two are closely linked and interrelated.
The Comneni had the bad fortune to preside over a sad era of economic decline. This occurred for several reasons: some years previously a great part of Asia Minor had been lost to the Seleucids, meaning that what had once been the richest lands in the Empire no longer generated taxes for the Emperor. Also regarding taxes, the pronoia, that inflexible institution that became ever more necessary as central administrative control continued to break down, granted the great lords of the Empire the right to collect taxes on their lands, permitting them of course to keep a portion of the revenue in return.
Byzantine territorial control had essentially been reduced by this point to the coasts of Asia Minor and the European part of the Empire (great extensions of coastline, but very little land area), at the very moment when the Byzantine navy was shrinking due to economic constraints. Hardly any new ships were being built, prompting the Venetian, Genoese and Pisan fleets to look with growing avarice toward these Greek seas.
Nonetheless, the strength and the fervor of Alex Comnene founded a dynasty of brilliant men who resolved many of the Empire’s problems and kept it on its feet and even growing for no less than a century.
John II Comnene
His accession to the throne.
On 15 August, 1118, Emperor Alex I Comnene died, almost certainly from a heart attack. With what was virtually his last breath he designated his son John II Comnene as successor to the throne, in spite of the pleas and demands of his wife, Irene Ducas, who desperately wanted the dying emperor to name Caesar Nicephorus Brienio, husband of Anna Comnena, as successor.

Even before Alex I drew his last breath John II was already rushing to take command of the Empire, hastening with the imperial seal to the Grand Palace in spite of the opposition of the guard. However, he overcame them and together with his supporters forced his way in and closed the doors to keep out the supporters of his sister Anna and his brother Andronicus who had joined forces with her. So great was John II’s insecurity that he did not even attend his father’s interment because it might have offered the rest of the family the opportunity to topple him from the throne.

John II enjoyed the support of his brother Isaac and that of his great friend John Axuco.
Later on when he was in control of the situation and firmly in the position of Emperor, John pardoned the plotters, thus demonstrating his greatness of character. One may justly say that he never failed to live up to the example of his father, finally earning from the both aristocratic and problematic Comneni family full recognition of his role as leader.
John II Comnene was chosen by his father Alex over the objections of his sister Anna and had to make a risky move to take power. Had he not done so, today we would be referring to the empress Anna Comnena.
He encountered an empire with many of its problems (but not all, of course) already resolved by his father. There were no crusades during his reign (!!!), and in general, foreign relations were less pressing for him than during the reigns of either his father or his son (although still by no means easy). This allowed John a certain degree of peace in which to plan out his government with his own character and intelligence. His policies were just as brilliant but more calm and thought-out than those of either his predecessor or his successor. This allowed John to turn over to his son, Manuel I an empire that was much larger and more powerful than the one he had inherited from his own father, Alex.
When the Pechenegs, who had previously been crushed by his father, rose up again and invaded the Empire, John was able to confront them in such a way that they disappeared from history, mainly because so many had died and the survivors had joined the Byzantine forces.
Laodicea and Sozopolis of Panfilia were retaken from the Turks.
The Seleucids were at the point of being defeated just like the Pechenegs, but the question of Antioch and the Hungarian problem (a new European power) did not allow this to happen.
The Serbs were defeated and many were deported to Asia Minor to occupy territories of crucial importance in the struggle against the Turks.
The Hungarians, who had invaded Serbian territory from the north, were attacked and forced to retreat back to their own homeland.
Luckily, Roger II, the arch-enemy of all things Byzantine, did not attack during John’s reign although he made many threats.
John also conquered the Armenians of Cilicia, occupying Tarsus and Mompsuestia in a move that had been prepared before the effective conquest of Antioch. In this way a large part of Asia Minor was recovered along with the great city of Antioch and part of northern Syria, an achievement never again equaled by any subsequent Byzantine ruler.
The only problem that could not be resolved was that of Venice. John first tried to cancel the concessions they had received under his father’s imperial decree but the Venetians, with their vast navy, occupied Rhodes, Chios, Lesbos and Samos, forcing the Emperor, who had virtually no navy, to capitulate to their demands and return all of their commercial rights.
At the time of his death, which may have been due to an unfortunate hunting accident (?) in Cilicia involving a poisoned arrow, he was already considering the reconquest of Jerusalem after having taken Antioch and other lands from the Turks and the old Norman crusaders. That is to say that prudently but firmly and with overwhelming strength he hoped to reconquer all of the territory that Byzantium had lost to the Seleucid Turks, plus that lost to the crusaders in Antioch and Syria, and to the Armenians in Cilicia, north of Syria.
John II was considered by his contemporaries and descendents as the greatest of the Comneni and according to Photios Malleros he was ‘one of the best and most resolute of the Byzantine sovereigns.’ According to Hertzberg, John was “the noblest among the Emperors who held the throne of Byzantium.”
Manuel I Comnene
Manuel Comnene was one of the most imposing figures in all of Byzantine history. His abilities were unequalled, his personality enthralling, his ambition limitless and his politics an unstoppable force.

He was a brilliant military leader, a great politician, a Byzantine without equal, with the grace of the Westerners, the courtly customs of knights and ladies, grand balls and jousting tournaments, things that had never before been seen in Byzantium.

His two marriages were with western noblewomen and his alliance with the Germanic Empire made all Byzantium look toward the West with an eye toward reconquest and universal domination.

Unfortunately for Manuel, by his era Europe had developed into many independent countries and city-states that absolutely scorned the idea of having an emperor and forming part of an empire.

His policies looked westward without ignoring the East, but without any doubt his principal objective was that of returning the West to Roman control and for this purpose he was ready to employ all the means at his disposal: the above-mentioned royal marriages, alliances, buying loyalties, etc.

The Treaty of 1149 between Conrad III and Manuel I.
An important part of Manuel’s politics was the treaty with the German emperor Conrad III reaffirming the treaty signed by Manuel’s father, John II.
Manuel’s objective was simultaneously simple and complex: on the one hand he was the Emperor and as such he was determined to enforce his title just as his predecessors had; on the other hand Europe was clearly divided into two great power-blocs: one composed of Roger II’s Normans, Louis VII’s France, Hungary, Serbia, the Guelphs, and even the Pope, and opposing them, Byzantium, Germany and Venice.
Roger II of Brindisi was the leader of the anti-Byzantine coalition and even wanted to launch a crusade against Constantinople, an idea which came to naught because of Conrad III’s fidelity to Byzantium.
The pact that was signed in Thessalonica envisioned an invasion of the entire Italian Peninsula. Negotiations were difficult because Manuel I gave this conquest a fundamental degree of importance in his foreign policy. He wanted to take the greatest possible advantage of it, until an agreement was finally arrived at. The invasion would be a joint operation and the Byzantines would establish themselves in the Apennine peninsula.
Conrad III, his German ally, had many problems given that his power was open to question even in his own country. As a member of the House of Hohenstaufen he was opposed to Papal policy, while his supporters were the Waiblingen (named for the castle that the family owned in Swabia) in Germany, and the Gibbelines in Italy.
Conrad III, together with the king of France, Louis VII, led the Second Crusade which suffered a devastating defeat in Damascus and was an overall failure. Conrad had enormous interest in controlling Italy but his position was shaky in his own country and in light of the terrible defeat in Damascus and the still immense power of Manuel Comnene, the treaty included provisions favorable to the Byzantines (as noted above, after arduous negotiations in Thessalonica).
For Manuel II this conquest was but the first step toward gaining universal power, but the death of Conrad III amidst the preparations for the invasion in 1152 brought the whole enterprise to ruin, given that the latter’s successor, Frederick Barbarosa had the same ambitions as Manuel I Comnene. Because of this, instead of a common action against France and the Normans, Germany’s relations with Byzantium were now those of competition for universal power. No longer was there a submissive Germany at the service of the Emperor.
The Reconquest of Italy
Manuel I could not invade the Italian peninsula together with Conrad III because, as is noted above, the German ruler died in the midst of preparations for this operation, and also because his successor, Frederick Barbarosa was not submissive to the wishes of the Byzantine Emperor; in fact, very much to the contrary. However, Manuel I would not remain on the sidelines. In 1155 he decided to launch the invasion, surely encouraged by the death of Roger II the year before. He sent a great fleet of ships to Ancona and began the restoration of the Roman Empire.
The cities of Apulia quickly fell into Byzantine hands, either by force of arms or because of the betrayal of the Norman princes of the region.
But Europe was no longer the same. All the European states united in opposition to the Emperor. Frederick Barbarosa, Venice, and of course William of Normandy declared themselves in opposition to Byzantium (which was already opposed by the king of France and by Hungary) and these European powers decided not to allow any restoration of Imperial power.
In 1156 William of Normandy defeated the Byzantines in Brindisi and shortly thereafter eliminated the Byzantine holdings in Italy, crushing, at least for the moment, Byzantine dreams of restoring the Roman Empire
However, Manuel I Comnene did not give up easily, considering the reverses suffered in the south of Italy but a minor setback, the result of undue haste on his part.
Even with a reformed State of a different character, with a highly decentralized structure, the idea of the restoration of the Roman Empire never ceased to obsess every Byzantine emperor, and most particularly Manuel Comnene, the product of a unique, thousand-year-old culture that merits much deeper study.
Myriokephalon and the End
Determined to eliminate the problems that the Empire was experiencing in the East, Manuel went out at the head of a great army to confront the Turks. The emperor suffered defeat but he and most of his army escaped unscathed.
Nevertheless, the battle of Myriokephalon in 1176 spelled the end of Manuel’s ambitions. Never again would the Byzantine state have the means to assemble an army that could carry out the necessary campaigns to sweep its enemies before it as it had once done.
The great emperor died four years later, devastated by his inability to achieve his dreams and sunk in deep sorrow, leaving his young son of seven years to head the empire with all the dangers that this represented.
Conclusion.
I believe that Manuel I Comnene may be justly accused of being off the mark in his ill-fated attempts to reconquer the territories that Byzantium had lost over the centuries, and in spending fortunes in the effort. However, in this he was only following in the imperial tradition of Justinian, Heraclius, Constantine V, Nicephorus Phocas, John Tzimisces and Basil II. I do not believe that this was necessarily a tragedy, but rather a necessary response to the needs of the Empire to recover lands that had been lost to the Turks, Normans and others.
Nonetheless, Manuel was a great emperor although his era was marked by the significant rise of Western powers which he either managed to subjugate (Germany) or to exasperate (France).
This rise, which characterized the great differences between his era and those of Justinian or even Basil II, allowed Western Europe to easily contain Byzantine ambitions even while respecting its power, a situation very different from that faced by the emperors of old.
The conquests of Manuel I could not be maintained by his successors and shortly thereafter would come the great blow of the Fourth Crusade in 1204, but it would be unjust to cast aspersions on the old emperor for doing the same thing that his more glorious predecessors did. Quite simply, Europe was not the same, nor was the Empire, and the imperial succession in Germany was unfavorable, all of which resulted in a West that was united against the Empire.
Manuel II Palaeologus, Emperor of Byzantium (1391-1425)
The life of an enlightened monarch and warrior who ruled an empire that was surrounded by enemies and gradually bleeding to death.
Rolando Castillo
“The emperor is predestined to rule the world, just as the eye is born to guide the body. God has no need of anyone; the Prince has need only for God. Between God and him there is no intermediary.”
Agapetus, 6th century.
Introduction.
Manuel Palaeologus is undoubtedly a very important figure in the history of the Byzantine Empire. He conclusively demonstrates that the Empire was still a living reality even into the 15th century, although many historians claim that everything really came to an end in 1204.
During his lifetime Byzantium continued to be represented by an emperor of noble blood, a man of note who possessed enough energy and intelligence to deal with the difficult era in which he lived and to control Balkan policy much better than his own possibilities would seem to allow. And, if this were not enough, just as though he were an adventurer or treasure-hunter he lived through some of the most incredible adventures that could ever be ascribed to a Byzantine ruler.
In all the history of the Empire there was none like him, for his alone were the unique circumstances of being the great emperor of a tiny and shrinking empire in its death-throes. He found himself in command of the capital and its immediate surroundings as well as the costal cities of the Black Sea and the southern costal cities of Thrace, Thessalonica and the Peloponnesus, where the Despotate of Mistra was reaching its cultural apogee in spire of the Ottoman menace. It is impossible even to imagine what Manuel felt when he saw his father’s empire crumbling away bit by bit, everything that he would be governing in the future falling to pieces.
But he did not have an easy life. He did not have enormous palaces with vast numbers of luxurious rooms, nor did he have the sumptuous treasures of his ancestors, the emperors of past centuries. He was taken prisoner several times, was caught up in the most difficult turns of events and was forced by circumstances to become part of the Sultan’s court. He was even obliged to command an army that would conquer a Byzantine city for the Sultan. Manuel bravely and stoically bore all these humiliations, overcoming them one by one and successfully establishing the best possible policy to overcome the fatal events that followed one after another at dizzying speed.
He never knew Constantinople when it was a city of marble and gold, great columns, grand avenues, palaces and churches filled with relics, nor when it was filled with happy residents who traded, worked, studied or trained for military service. He knew only a capital in ruins, dominated by the Italian republics in every sense, surrounded and strangled by a nascent Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless there were occasional moments of respite, particularly when Manuel’s wise policies prevailed or when some outside aid was generously provided, although this did not often occur.
For all these reasons and more we can see that it is worthwhile in this work to consider Manuel as one of the greatest of Byzantine monarchs. He was undoubtedly responsible for Byzantium’s continued survival and he kept its hopes alive much longer than otherwise could have been expected. Little by little we will discover a figure who knew how to live as his world required him to live, a world filled with dangers, intrigues and betrayals, with Ottoman domination on the one hand and the greed of the Italian republics on the other. In spite of all this he was able to make the best of every small advantage that was available to him.
And if this were not enough to establish the magnitude of his character, Manuel was also an excellent writer, a man who devoted a great part of his risky life to letters. It is as though in each of his writings, in each letter he wrote, one may discover his true personality: that of a cultured, sensitive and friendly man who also knew how to be an emperor.
Finally we must examine the life of a man who perfectly understood his people, who never went against the wishes of the common people of Byzantium, a people who respected him and who ended up adoring him as none other. He was never willing, as were his father and later his two sons, to betray the sentiments of his citizens by bending the knee to the Roman church. This fact alone shows that, in spite of his own ideas which were probably in favor of a saving but shameful union, Manuel knew how to interpret what the people felt about union and submission to the Papacy: that it would spell the true death of Byzantium.
In this his greatness shines through even more clearly because he knew that he had to renounce his own ideas in order to maintain the pride and religious independence of his native land. Even though he was not above begging, even though he traveled abroad to ask for help, to plead for aid in near-desperation, he always did so with the dignity that was his, never on his knees and never promising that which he could never deliver: the soul of his people.
Manuel, the Man.
Manuel Palaeologus was born in 1350, second son of the emperor John V (1341-1391) and Elena (1333-1396), who, in turn, was the daughter of the emperor John Cantacuzene (1347-1354).
Thus Manuel inherited imperial blood from both his father and mother, from two of the most distinguished families of the Empire. He was fairly tall, elegant, and carried himself like a sovereign. According to chroniclers of the time the sultan Beyazid commented that even if he did not know that Manuel was an emperor he would have recognized it from the latter’s very appearance. Manuel had great power in his gaze and an extraordinary resoluteness for a Byzantine ruler of the final era. According to the writers of the time he always enjoyed an amazing energy and the health of a man of iron. He was very well educated, greatly enjoyed reading, and was an extraordinary writer who devoted part of his time to composing theological studies, rhetorical works, a variety of other different written works and an enormous number of letters which, luckily, are still extant.
Manuel’s was a life that was marked out by luck, which in his case usually escaped him, so much so that that he became melancholy and sometimes disconsolate due to his serious and responsible preoccupation with the destiny of his empire. In spite of this, his sensitive and cultured personality was admired by everyone who knew him even in the demanding pre-renaissance Western world.
In spite of all these humanist characteristics he was also an extraordinary soldier, a distinguished warrior as was expected of a Byzantine lord, and he showed this in repeated acts of courage. With his word of command he inspired the people both to follow him without hesitation and to love him as no other in those sad final decades of the Empire.
At a mature age he married Helen Dragases, daughter of the Serbian prince Constantine Dragases. They had seven sons: Michael, who died in infancy, John, who became his successor as John VIII from 1425 until his death in 1448, Andronicus, governor of Thessalonica until 1422 and his death that year from serious illness., Theodore, Despot of the Morea as Theodore II (1407-1442), Constantine, Despot of Mistra (1443-1448) and successor to Juan VIII as Constantine XI (148-1453), the last emperor of Byzantium, Demetrius, Despot of the Morea (1449-1460), and Thomas, also Despot of the Morea (1430-1460).
With the formation of such a family Manuel assured the succession to the throne in the best way possible, even endorsing his oldest child as preferred candidate over the rest in order to avoid conflict. This was a very wise method of avoiding intra-family civil wars for succession, which had been one of the causes of the Empire’s decline. Although it was too late, he nonetheless did succeed in this where other great emperors like Basil II or Manuel Comnene had failed. His two emperor sons also failed in this respect.
Thus reaffirming family unity and the confidence and loyalty of his sons, Manuel assured himself of a system of government which was imposed in a very intelligent way, granting each of his sons a territory to govern in his own name, which allowed the Emperor to gain a certain degree of homogeneity in an empire that was geographically divided and surrounded by enemies. The danger of civil wars, which had been so common within the governing family, was thus eliminated thanks to his life’s work, imposing his own voice over those of his all his sons who obeyed him without hesitation until, old and tired, he finally retired to a monastery.
One of his most important pleasures was that of writing in a diversity of genres and styles. He was able to make his writing stand out due to the excellent rhetoric he employed. Among other things, he wrote the “Epitaph for the Despot Theodore of Mistra (more than one hundred pages long), a “Treatise on Dreams,” a “Treatise on the Duties of a Prince,” an ekphrasis on a tapestry in the old palace of the Louvre (between 1401 and 1402), and innumerable letters which stand out for their historical and literary value. His wish to gain immortality with his written works is clear from that fact that he sent one of his works to the Italian humanist Guarino de Verona to be translated into Latin or Italian. His text was to go beyond the Byzantine world to become part of the new European world that was in birth.
Manuel Palaeologus has often been relegated to secondary historical status by common consent of historians who blame him for making treaties with the Turks, of being a mere vassal, of begging all the other states for money and soldiers, etc., etc. Nonetheless, beneath that “weak and scared” “sheep’s clothing” with which history-writers have clothed him, one finds a real human being with many positive characteristics such as his true love for the Empire, his natural voice of command that guided his troops, the intelligence and versatility shown in his writing, his ability to understand the different situations that life may present, and above all his dignity. In spite of having suffered all the range of extremely unpleasant humiliations that were dealt to him by bitter fate, he always kept his head held high until the last when, retired in a monastery, elderly and exhausted, he died at peace with himself and with the Byzantine people who loved him as no other emperor in the final three centuries of the Empire’s life.
We must also point out that in spite of the fact that the Empire was in frank decline and at the verge of collapse and extinction, the figure of the Byzantine Emperor still held the same mystique and the same importance that it did in centuries past. He would remain the head of the Eastern Church and as such the person chosen by God to govern this world according to His dictates. Manuel fulfilled this duty to the highest degree and far from being a minor character was one of the principle protagonists of his time.
And, as the historical protagonist that he was, he always behaved in a manner worthy of an emperor even though sometimes humiliated by the Sultan, sometimes overcome by circumstances, and, yes, sometimes committing acts that brought about enormous failures. All of this makes his noble bearing even more distinguished.
The era in which he lived.
“Barely out of infancy and before reaching the age of manhood I was thrown into a life full of evil and turbulence, but this would allow me to foresee that the future would force us to look back at the past as an era of serene tranquility.“
Manuel Palaeologus
In order to understand his life and works we must first describe certain facts that show us the world that this figure had to live in, and which will show him to have all the qualities of a great emperor even in the absence of a great empire to govern. These two special characteristics make Manuel a unique figure in the history of his time.
His father, John V, was emperor from 1341 until 1391, although with many interruptions caused by the uneasy state of the Byzantine imperial court in that era, coups d’état, betrayals and foreign influence. John was committed to religious unity with Rome, perhaps influenced by his mother, Anna of Savoy’s inclination toward the West. He thus held with a near-fanatical insistence that the only way to save the Empire was through Western aid.
How firmly convinced the ruler was of this point is shown by an extremely unusual letter (especially considering it was written by a Byzantine Emperor, perhaps because of its frankness) which offered Manuel to the Pope as a hostage for a term of five years as a guarantee of his promises of union, the child to be educated by the Pope himself. In the event that John could not fulfill his promises he would abdicate and Manuel, under the tutelage of the Pope, would govern the Empire, and of course the Pope would govern as regent until the child reached the age of majority. Innocent VI did not take the letter seriously but responded with a combination of effusive praise and evasions meant to chill out the emperor’s proposals. John was ultimately forced to recognize that the Byzantine people would never accept this kind of madness.
Manuel II succeeded to the Byzantine throne at a time when any hope of a total recovery of Byzantium’s territory had almost been lost, even though the Byzantine imperial ideal remained as strong as ever. The principal factors that determined the situation were firstly the Ottomans’ great activity in the Balkans and their conquest of the kingdoms surrounding the Empire, and secondly, the cutthroat competition between Venice and Genoa for the remains of Byzantium. Then there was the division within the house of the Palaeologoi itself, which had in the past caused immense bloodshed and ongoing loss of power. Finally there was the great loss of territory, first of all to the hands of the Slavic kingdoms such as those of the Serbs and Bulgars and later to the Ottomans. All these factors had brought about a disastrous situation from which there was little hope of escape, at least without the help of a West that was so despised by the people.
Thus Manuel acceded to the throne in the midst of an intense power struggle among those seeking to establish their influence in the Byzantine imperial court in order to defend their own interests, which were always contrary to those of the people and the rulers of the Empire.
Byzantine territorial control had been reduced to the capital itself and its immediate surroundings, the Morea (but only a part of the southern Peloponnesus), the southern coast of Thrace, Thessalonica and its surrounding area, a few southern Aegean islands and some cities along the European coast of the Black Sea. This was a virtually untenable situation which simultaneously required great diplomatic and great military skill so as not to disappear within a matter of months. This was the equilibrium that was reached by the Emperor, which shows that Manual was on top of circumstances. -
For more than three centuries Venice had been encysted in the body of the Empire. Venetian territories included the entire island of Crete, the Adriatic ports of Escutari, Alessio and Dirrachium, the island of Corfu, the Peloponnesian ports of Modon, Coron, Argos and Nauplion, and the island of Eubea with the important port of Negroponto. Thus, Venetian domination extended from the Dalmatian coast to the eastern Aegean, all of these very important commercial ports.
Ever since the reconquest of Constantinople in 1261, more than three hundred years before, by the troops of Michael VIII, the first Palaeologian emperor, Genoa had a very strong presence in Byzantine territory. The Genoese dominated and owned the islands of Chios and Militene, Phocea on the western coast of Asia Minor, the southern Thracian port of Eno, the colony of Pera, the southern Black Sea ports of Amastris and Simios, the northern Black Sea towns of Kilia, Moncastro and Cafta, and the entire southeastern Crimea, with the ports of Cembalo, Soldaya and Kerch. Thus, their dominions covered the coasts from southeastern Asia Minor to the Crimea, with many ports along the southern and western coasts of the Black Sea. Another important piece of the puzzle was Famagusta, Cyprus, taken by the Genoese in 1373.
Both Genoa and Venice, and even Pisa had commercial quarters within a Constantinople which was already in serious decline and which had many areas in a disastrous state, many neighborhoods virtually abandoned and crops growing where palaces or residential villas once stood. Nonetheless, the neighborhoods controlled by the Italian republics were prosperous and usually yielded good profits for the traders who lived there.
The Turks had established themselves in the Balkans much more recently, particularly after 1355, but their advance was sometimes unstoppable. In contrast to the Italian republics they conquered inland territories with incomparable eagerness while the Italians preferred to concentrate on the coasts and islands. During the first fifty years of Manuel’s life the Ottomans, who were already firmly settled in Asia Minor, conquered all of Bulgaria, southern Serbia, Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace, eventually extending their control from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and from the Danube to the border of Neopatria, all of this between 1350 and 1402.
An enormous extent of territory was brought under their control by force of arms and the not inconsiderable effort of ordinary inhabitants who were eager to occupy and settle new areas and take control of their resources. Wherever the Turks went they settled in and became lords and masters. Now, all they lacked in order to extend their mastery over all the historically Byzantine territories was the south of Greece, Epirus, several cities of Thrace, and of course Constantinople itself.
First Political Steps (1371 – 1373)
“Also, the malign and envious spirit has on many occasions revealed many things that are to come, not only in dreams but also with certain omens (…) in the first place deceiving and then working our perdition with his lies. In conclusion, he does not tell the truth from foreknowledge, but rather by imagining and conjecturing it. Sometimes he voluntarily deceives, and sometimes because he is mistaken.”
Manuel Palaeologus. “La epístola Peri Oneiraton de Manuel Paleólogo” Ignacio R Alfageme, Cuadernos de Filología Clásica, II, (1971) pp. 227 – 255. From http://www.tdx.cesca.es/
As a good son of a Byzantine Emperor, Manuel would have participated in political affairs from a very early age, first in the shadow of his father and his older brother Andronicus, surely the future heir to the throne. In spite of his youth, Manuel always showed a good sense for government, a great love for his father and his people and decisiveness when resolving the difficult questions that were put to him. Here is a series of events in which he participated, always showing both intelligence and valor.
One of the first episodes in which he was called upon to demonstrate his loyalty to his father occurred in 1371. Manuel, who was at that point governor of Thessalonica at the age of 21, had to rescue John V who, on his way back from his trip to Rome where he personally submitted himself to the Pope against the will of his people, passed through Venice and was “detained” for some ten months against his will for payment of a debt that dated back several years, back to when the Empress Anna had pawned the crown jewels in return for a loan.
To gain his freedom John offered the Venetians the strategic island of Tenedos. Andronicus, John’s eldest son, had stayed behind as regent in the Emperor’s absence and refused to turn over the island not out of patriotism bur rather as a mere servant of the Genoese who exerted political control from their colony at Galata across the Golden Horn from Constantinople.
The island of Tenedos was a fundamentally strategic port facing the Dardanelles Straits with an excellently build and secure dock where large numbers of ships would often anchor while sailing through the region.
To Manuel fell the duty of collecting in Thessalonica the money that was so crucial and scarce for the Empire in those days, and then quickly sailing to free his father. Here we must point out that Manuel was the Emperor’s favorite son, preferred even over his firstborn, Andronicus, who was of bad character and easily drawn into political problems.
That same year one of those events occurred that would forever change the future of the Balkans: on 26 September on the banks of the Maritza River the Ottomans crushingly defeated a Serbian army, effectively giving them virtually wide-open access to the entire region. Now Serbia, Macedonia, Greece and Thrace were much more accessible to the conquerors. The Serbian princes and nobles were forced to swear fealty as vassals of Murad and soon this state of affairs would extend throughout the Balkans, including the Bulgar lords.
Manuel never ignored an opportunity to take advantage of every situation, no matter how negative or difficult. Thus the Byzantines took advantage of the situation after the battle to reconquer Serres, most recently under the rule of the Serbian princes. The city was administered personally by Manuel for some time thereafter. This approach which has been criticized by some historians as petty and selfish because Byzantium was taking advantage of the fall of other Christian princes should not be misunderstood. The fact that a Byzantine Emperor recovered a city that had once been part of the Empire is not open to criticism. We must remember that according to Byzantine political doctrine, everything that was once the Empire’s remained forever part of the Empire, even though temporarily conquered by other peoples. Manuel did what anyone else in his position would have done, seeking to gain control of goods, money and men who would help him reconquer all the Byzantine territories, a dream that at that moment he believed was within his reach.
Nevertheless, events were moving toward a growing Ottoman domination over the whole region and in 1373 John became no more than a vassal of Murad. This was part of the unfortunate policy of the Emperor, who had no confidence in his own forces. Watching the possibility of a Western crusade disappear before his eyes and seeing Serbia and Bulgaria transformed into Ottoman vassal states, he opted to ally himself with them.
Another important factor in this decision was the worry caused by the presence of his son Andronicus in the imperial court as a virtual agent of the ambitious Genoese. The worst part of this already shameful situation came when Murad ordered John to accompany him on campaign in Asia Minor, a request which the Emperor could not refuse. In spite of everything, Manuel remained loyal to his father even while refusing to share his ill-starred policy of subservience to the Ottomans.
There were many things that Manuel might not have shared with his father, but nonetheless his loyal spirit always acknowledged that John, not he, was the emperor, the direct opposite of the attitude of his older brother Andronicus.
Manuel as Co-emperor (1373-1391)
“All those outside the walls of the City pay tribute to the Turks, and those who are within succumb to misery and unrest.”
Demetrius Cidones
Letter to Caloferos. 1378
We have already spoken of Andronicus’ attitude toward the Republic of Genoa. The heir apparent was also complicit with certain Turkish elements, with those who were planning actions that would determine the future course of Balkan policy and very particularly, Manuel’s own future.
So it was that the eldest son and heir of John V organized a revolt against his own father, an action which failed largely due to the unpopularity of the Genoese in Constantinople. And, since this had been planned to coincide with an uprising led by the Ottoman heir apparent, Saudji Tchelebi, Sultan Murad blinded his own son and forced John, at this point a mere vassal of the Sultan, to blind his son as well in order that the two rebels should receive the same exemplary punishment.
As a consequence of this, Manuel was crowned co-emperor on 25 September, 1373. The failure of Andronicus’ betrayal thus determined the future of the man who had up to that point been no more than his father’s loyal prince.
In spite of his punishment, in reality John’s firstborn son only suffered minor injuries that did not totally rob him of his sight. This was by express order of his father who, obviously, did not want to go through with it. However, this allowed Andronicus to continue his involvement in politics, to the greater misfortune of the Empire. This measure would bring upon John and Manuel more than one future misfortune. We do not know whether John eventually regretted his lenience toward his son, but it is very likely.
As for Byzantium, its problems continued without ongoing solution. In the year 1376 John V received a visit by a Venetian embassy which suggested that he should comply with his promise to turn over the island of Tenedos in exchange for an additional thirty thousand ducats plus the return of the crown jewels. We have already spoken about Tenedos and its critical importance to navigation at the entrance to the Dardanelle Straits. For the moment, the island remained under the control of a Byzantine governor.
This Venetian approach and offer did not please the Genoese, who encouraged Andronicus to surround Constantinople. He, in turn, visited Murad and promised him Gallipoli in exchange for the latter’s help in occupying the city. Then, after an arduous siege of 32 days John V’s eldest son entered the capital with part Genoese and part Turkish troops and imprisoned his father and his inseparable Manuel, who was then 26 years old, in the Tower of Anemas.
However, with the help of the population of the island and especially that of the Byzantine governor who was opposed to the Genoese turnover, Tenedos was occupied by the Venetians in October of 1376. This is yet another instance of the pernicious influence of these two Italian republics on Byzantine territory, forever profiting from betrayal, corruption or simple brute force. Meanwhile, the Empire was falling apart island by island, city by city, and territory by territory.
As a consequence of the treaty he had signed, late in 1377 Andronicus turned Gallipoli over to Murad, in payment for his earlier promise. This action proved fatal for the future of the Empire, since with Gallipoli in their hands the Ottomans could cross by the thousands from Asia to the Balkans, without anyone to stop them. The possession of this port was essential to supply the Ottoman army with thousands and thousands of young recruits from all the Turkish hamlets of Asia. They were drawn by the adventure of conquering a new territory that the Sultans were trying to organize ever better, with more Turkish participation, even though they were still only lands given in vassalage with the promise of tribute to the Sultan.
In a daring stroke, John and Manuel escaped from their prison two years later with the help of the Venetians. As soon as they were beyond the walls they headed for Crysopolis, close to which was Murad’s camp. They obtained an audience with the Sultan to whom they ended up promising military aid and the city of Philadelphia, the last remaining Byzantine possession in Asia Minor, in return for his help in recovering the City. This was yet another action determined by necessity, forced by Andronicus’ betrayal. It was not Manuel’s wish to resort to Turkish help but John’s policy was very clear: remain a vassal of the Sultan in order to obtain benefits. Manuel once again proved his loyalty by supporting his father but it was still not evident that there was any other possible way out.
Murad placed a small army at John and Manuel’s disposal and the Venetians, who despised Andronicus IV for his pacts with the Genoese, gave them a small fleet. With this help they regained control of the City on 1 July, 1379. Andronicus took refuge in Galata, the Genoese colony on the opposite side of the Golden Horn in Pera. There were skirmishes and permanent tension between the supporters of Manuel and those of Andronicus, and John was unable to establish peace for a period of about two years. Ups and downs like this were very common and the political instability allowed no one to feel safe, particularly given the influence of foreigners whose sole interest was their own benefit and who ended up undermining any attempts to put the Empire back on its feet.
The Loss of Thessalonica, Manuel’s Great Failure.
It seemed as though the Turkish march through the Balkans was unstoppable. In 1380 the Ottomans under the command of Jaireddin entered Ochrida and Prilep, advancing into Albania. One by one the Albanian warlords were defeated, taking away their territory. It took several years but the Ottomans continued establishing themselves in power, helped by the tremendous divisions among the Christian powers of the region.
The rivalry between John and his son Andronicus put the imperial family in an unsustainable situation. To overcome this situation, even though one cannot discard the possibility that Genoese influence was involved, in 1381 John once again placed Andronicus on the throne as part of peace treaty which put an end to the hostilities and competition within the governing family. However, the reality was that Andronicus governed beside Manuel. The fact that great disputes took place for the throne also demonstrates that figure of the Emperor still held the prestige it had enjoyed in years past. The Emperor would remain the representative of God on Earth and fighting for the throne was still worth the effort even though the real Empire was falling to bits.
The situation in Byzantium became ever more unprecedented, as was shown in 1383 when Manuel took possession of Thessalonica as Emperor, even though the territories were divided among the members of the Palaeologian family: John V governed from Constantinople, Manuel II from Thessalonica, his brother Andronicus IV from the coasts of the Marmara in the south of Thrace, and Theodore in the Peloponnesus. Each one w as practically independent from the others, yet all depended on the Sultan. Four emperors for such a tiny and divided Empire, without a central government, was true madness.
In spite of these intra-familial divisions Manuel was the only one who actually governed in any real fashion, as corresponded to his own personal character. As a warlord he did what a real emperor needed to do, transforming Thessalonica into the true center of imperial activity. Eventually he extended his authority over Macedonia and Thessaly and increased resistance to the Ottomans.
However, the other territories and their respective rulers were, as noted earlier, vassals of Murad, who used the port of Gallipoli to bring ever more troops across from his Asian camps to Europe to fulfill his plan for organizing the Balkans and conquering all the territories that remained for the moment under Byzantine control.
At that point Manuel still believed that with enough energy and struggle against the Turks he could move forward and for this reason for the first time he broke with John V’s policy of accords with the Ottomans. When on 19 September, 1383 the Turkish general Jaireddin, acting on Murad’s orders, took the city of Serres which had been in Byzantine hands, Manuel resolved to expel the Turks from all of Macedonia. He plotted with the nobles of the city and in one night beheaded the entire Turkish garrison that had been left to guard Serres.
However, a response was not long in coming. Furious at the news, Murad ordered Jaireddin to direct his forces toward Thessalonica where Manuel was, ordering his general to take the city by violent assault and to exact due vengeance for what had happened in Serres.
The Ottoman General Jaireddin placed the city of Thessalonica under siege in October, 1383, and immediately sent ambassadors to Manuel to warn him that if he did not open the gates of the city the young Byzantine ruler would have to bear the responsibility for a massacre. The co-emperor responded that he would defend the city to the death. He then called all its citizens to the main square, exhorted them to fight the Turks with all their strength and began to issue orders for the city’s defense. The enthusiasm of Manuel, at that point thirty-three years old and at the peak of his strength, spread to all the inhabitants of the Macedonian city, the second jewel in the imperial crown, and everyone eagerly ran to fight and give their lives for the freedom that Manuel had promised them.
Thessalonica was surrounded by land but the Ottomans still did not have a significant fleet, which made it easy to receive outside aid. Nonetheless, in the three and one half years that the siege lasted nobody came to Manuel’s aid, and sheer misery ended up defeating the inhabitants of the city more surely than the Sultan’s weapons. After three years under siege, the citizens’ morale was totally destroyed and at that point the only thing they wanted to do was to surrender to the Sultan and return to some semblance of normalcy, even though under a Turkish vassal regime.
Defeated not in a military sense but by the collapse of his own people’s morale, Manuel, who still refused to surrender, was taken prisoner by the city’s leaders, who demanded surrender. Resigned to his fate, Manuel could do no more than deal with the local aristocracy.
Thus it was that Manuel fled the city in disguise on 6 April, 1387, avoiding the Turkish guards on the way to Lesbos, abandoning the city that he loved so much. Three days later those who remained in Thessalonica opened the gates of the city to avoid a massacre. The second city of the Empire now passed into Ottoman hands. The second gem in the Byzantine crown thus ended up in enemy hands, thanks to the events in Serres for which Manuel bore principal responsibility.
This was the greatest failure in the life of the Byzantine prince, a disaster that would mark him forever. In the future he would try to avoid such a disastrous and unfortunate acts like that perpetrated in Serres in hopes that his future might be somewhat more secure, if that were at all possible, and he learned how to measure his actions politically with the Turks, whom he was finally coming to understand
John V was furious with Manuel because he did not want any direct confrontations with the Turks, preferring agreements to confrontation, while Manuel had done just the opposite. His defeat in Thessalonica seemed to prove that John’s policy was correct, even though in reality all it had proven was that with courage, sacrifice and bravery one could resist, and only the total absence of outside aid was able to bring about defeat. For this reason Manuel’s actions in Thessalonica could best be described as the product of a good attitude but marked by poor political calculation. Not ensuring the assistance of allies before provoking the Turks brought disaster, a lesson that Manuel would never forget as long as he lived.
John sent Manuel into exile to the island of Lemnos after stripping him of all his titles and honors, allowing him time to recover from his provocations against the Ottomans.
In 1385, while Thessalonica was under siege John’s unruly son Andronicus IV Palaeologus died. His life had been one of misfortune, bringing many evils upon the Empire. His was a life that in reality would continue in the person of his son John VII, a man who hated John and above all Manuel and who would arrange things to continue his father’s policy in favor of Genoa and of submission to the Turks.
The Unstoppable Ottomans.
Continuing Ottoman conquests in this era, that same year Murad advanced toward the north and conquered Sardica and Nis, crushing all the Bulgarian forces that stood in his way.
Also in 1385, while Thessalonica was being blockaded by Jaireddin’s army other troops defeated Albanian forces at Sawra, close to El Bassan, and the following year they advanced on and took Croia and Scutari. Thus began the conversion of a great number of Albanians to the faith of Muhammad with the consequent power advantage this provided when they joined the Ottoman army, where they distinguished themselves by their courage and bravery.
As to Manuel we can say that confronting a figure like Murad was in no way advantageous, first of all because the situation was already in favor of the Ottomans and then because the Sultan’s administration was excellent. Murad took it upon himself to turn the conquests of his predecessors and his own into something more closely resembling an Ottoman state able to govern all the conquered territories with a strong, well-trained army at the ready, with multiple religious centers and with ever more inhabitants coming over from Anatolia.
Although he could not impose uniformity upon his government which largely continued to depend on the vassalage and submission of local princes, he achieved great advances in the administration of conquered lands. This unity was a bit more established than in past years thanks to the powerful Turkish army that moved with great speed throughout all the territory and which was able to crush rebellion after rebellion. Another advantage that Murad gained in those years with his conquering attitude was a greater prestige for the Sultan, which in turn brought greater fidelity to his cause on the part of his vassals.
On the other hand, Manuel found no help available from his father or his brothers, especially Andronicus IV, with his personal ambition and political shortsightedness.
If this were not bad enough, as a condition of his return as co-emperor at the side of his father Manuel had to beg for pardon from Murad for the Serres incident of 1383 and for resisting him in Thessalonica. This was an enormous loss of face for the future emperor and an undeniable recognition of his state of vassalage to the Turks.
What is more, Manuel feared the true intentions of the Sultan and only dared to seek an audience with him when he could be assured that Murad would receive him without any ill-will.
Murad then interceded on Manuel’s behalf with John V in order that he might pardon his son, something that John certainly would not have done without the Sultan’s authorization. This was how bad things really were in Byzantium, totally dependent upon the whim of the Ottoman Sultan.
However, the political environment was changing. Even though they were Christian, the Italian republics began to sign treaties with the Turks in the face of the enormous catastrophe that was befalling the Empire. Evidently interested in maintaining trade in these vitally important regions, they preferred to sign trade pacts with the Sultan rather than defend a Christian country like their own. Genoa did so in 1385 and Venice in 1388. With this, the fate of Byzantium was effectively sealed, transforming it into a dependent state bereft of support from almost any quarter.
One of the most notable events of the era occurred in the battle of Kosovo. Murad moved against Serbia in 1389, suddenly finding himself confronted by an immense Christian army under the command of one of the most promising Serbian princes, Lazar Hrebelianovitch. On the so-called “Field of Blackbirds” on the plains of Kosovo the two armies met in a clash that would decide the future of the Serbian nation. There the Ottomans, after a crushing initial attack against the Serbians, were able to stop them. Although Murad was stabbed to death in the midst of the battle by a captured Serbian prince who had been summoned into the Sultan’s presence, Murad’s son Beyazid took charge of the situation, took control and had himself proclaimed Sultan then and there on the battlefield. Taking command with immense personal energy, he ended up crushing his enemies who beheld the complete destruction of their nation. The mighty Turkish infantry overpowered the noble Serbian cavalry and Serbia was wiped from the map.
This left Byzantium totally isolated in the East. The Serbian princes had still been able to maintain contact with central Europe but after the battle this became impossible. This isolation became ever more suffocating and a sense of desperation invaded every soul in Constantinople.
In Beyazid’s first years the Ottomans knew only victory, even though he was very different from his father. With all his energy and powers of organization Beyazid distinguished himself by following his own whims. He could be supremely magnanimous and limitlessly cruel, all on the same day. He was nicknamed “Lightning” or “Yildrim” in his own language, and was the first to adopt the title of Sultan of Rum, like the old Seljuk Sultans. However, for Beyazid this title remained incomplete without the city, Constantinople, which he now saw as within his grasp.
Beyazid was well aware of the divisions within the Palaeologian imperial family and for this reason in 1390 he lent a small force to the son of the ill-famed Andronicus, John VII, so that he could return to the city from his refuge in Galata and try to expel John and Manuel. However, these two dug in at the nearby fortress of the Golden Portal and while John V resisted, Manuel escaped to get help, later to return victorious with nine borrowed galleys. On 17 September of that year John V and Manuel destroyed John VII’s forces and drove him away from the city. It is hardly necessary to point out that the only thing that this sort of conflict accomplished was to help the Ottomans, but Beyazid’s policy was to continue to promote conflict among the Palaeologians.
John VII Palaeologus
Beyazid was furious when he learned of the victory of Juan V and Manuel. At first he demanded that John pull down the fortress of the Golden Portal and threatened to pluck out Manuel’s eyes if he did not do so. Then he decided to summon the two Byzantine princes, Manuel and his nephew John, to help him to conquer the last fortified point in Asia Minor, the city of Philadelphia. Even though John V had promised Philadelphia to Murad several years previously it is very probable that at the moment of truth the Byzantine governor had decided not to open the gates to the Turks. For this reason it remained the only possession left to the Byzantines in Asia and as such, could have been of crucial future importance if existing conditions were to change.
It was an exquisitely cruel irony that the new Sultan posed in this decision, forcing two members of the imperial family who hated each other and had very different ideas about what was to be done to participate together in an attack against the last unconquered Byzantine city in Asia Minor. Much more than a simple anecdote, this proves the power that the leader of the Ottoman nation had over the Byzantine emperors, inheritors of a millennium of glory. With this action Beyazid showed who really ruled in the Balkans.
Manuel as Emperor (1391-1425)
“If you wish to follow my orders, close the gates of the City and reign within, because everything outside the City belongs to me”
Beyazid [Ducas, History]
At the time of the death of his father, Emperor John V on 16 February, 1391, Manuel, who at this point was forty-one years old, found himself a hostage at the court of Sultan Beyazid. He was perfectly aware that the Sultan would name his hated nephew, John VII as new emperor, being that the latter offered him unconditional submission. Consequently, Manuel decided to escape from the Ottoman capital, located for the moment in Brusa, and head for Constantinople. On the night of 7 March under cover of darkness and taking advantage of the confidence the Turkish guards had in him as a respected nobleman, he left Brusa and set out for the Byzantine capital where he was received by the people with great enthusiasm. Thus began his reign, defying the power of the Sultan, occupying the place which belonged to him without anyone being able to stand in his way.
In response to this humiliation on the part of the Emperor, Beyazid, who at that point was very angry and offended, decreed the closure of all roads leading to the City, imposing such a savage blockade that, with time, it led to a growing impoverishment of the City and the total ruin of many of its neighborhoods and inhabitants, already on the decline for many years. According to the Byzantine historian Ducas the situation was so critical that people were pulling down their wooden houses to use the wood as fuel to bake bread. The situation of the Empire was as dire as that as Manuel assumed control of its destiny.
Nonetheless, Beyazid was still not satisfied and demanded that a special zone be created in Constantinople for Ottoman traders, under the sovereignty of the Sultan and with its own laws. Finally, as a new touch of cruel irony he forced Manuel to take part in a military campaign along the coast of the Black Sea.
In spite of these repeated insults to his dignity and the extreme difficulty of his situation the Emperor remained firm and energetic at the head of the Empire, showing that even though others might have controlled his fate in past years the story could well have come out differently. He did not waver, he did not flee, and he did not surrender as others had done.
At the age of forty-two, Manuel married Helen Dragases, daughter of the Serbian prince of Serres, Constantine Dragas, who also suffered the fate of being a vassal of the Sultan. Thus was forged the union of two noble families who shared the same sad destiny and an uncertain future.
To celebrate the wedding, which took place on 10 February, 1392, Manuel decided that he ought to be crowned together with his new wife. Even though he had already been crowned co-emperor nineteen years earlier, this time he would do it as emperor of all Christendom, the one chosen by God to direct the Empire’s affairs on Earth. The ceremony was an attempt to emulate all the pomp and circumstance of years gone by, which in the eyes of the people meant that the Empire was still alive in spite of all the affronts that it was suffering and those that it might still have to bear.
Following Byzantine tradition Manuel remained firm in his command post in the Blachernae Palace until the end of 1393, but in the beginning of 1394 he received another summons from the Sultan, one that he could not refuse. The Sultan warned him to report immediately to Serres where the Turkish ruler had his encampment. When he arrived, Manuel met Theodore, Despot of Mistra, along with his father-in-law Constantine Dragas, his hated nephew John VII, and Stephen Lazarevich, Prince of Serbia. None of them knew that the others had been summoned. The emperor realized that Beyazid had planned this encounter in order to rid himself of his most undesirable subjects. However, the Sultan warned them to obey him always or else pay the consequences, and then allowed them to leave, only lashing them with hundreds of threats that, luckily, were not carried out. The miracle had occurred; the unstable Sultan had not decided to act, surely struggling with confused ideas within himself. Manuel knew for the rest of his life that he had been saved thanks only to fortune, which this time was with him. He immediately returned to the City, thanking God for his fate.
The next time that Beyazid summoned him Manuel refused to report as ordered. With this he knew that he was provoking the Sultan and even risking open war against Byzantium but it is certain that the Emperor though this was the best option and that the City was definitely still unconquerable.
His decision was also largely due to the call that Sigismund of Hungary had issued to the rulers of Christendom. Hungary was now the nation most threatened by the seemingly-unstoppable Turkish menace which was pointing its claws toward central Europe. For this reason Sigismund’s response was the only one possible under the circumstances. Following a direct plea for help from Sigismund, Manuel was even able to form an alliance with the Genoese of Lesbos and Chios and the Knights of Rhodes, but this association was unable to participate in the crusade because they were effectively surrounded by Ottoman forces. Nonetheless, it is probable that Manuel did manage to send a certain amount of money to the crusade as his contribution to the campaign. It was only logical that an emperor such as he would make every possible effort to help those who sought to liberate the Balkans from the Ottoman yoke.
On 25 September, 1396, barely five years after Manuel’s coronation, the disastrous battle of Nicopolis took place in which a great army of crusaders including sixty thousand Hungarians, ten thousand Franks, seven thousand Germans and ten thousand Wallachians, all under the command of Sigismund of Hungary, was defeated by Beyazid’s Ottomans. The amazing Ottoman infantry was much stronger than Sigismund’s knights in shining armor who had tried to sustain their daring advance in vain even when their leader was not in agreement. The world of the Balkans shook and the grand winner, Beyazid, ended up dreaming of being the future destroyer of Byzantium.
The Sultan then began a ferocious campaign to destroy Byzantium, and his first step was to take control of Selymbria and to order his troops to begin the invasion of the Peloponnesus. On 21 June, 1397 the Ottomans defeated the army of the Despot Theodore I of Mistra, brother of Manuel, at Leontarion. However, after taking numerous prisoners the Turks returned to Thessaly. Also as part of this campaign the city of Argos was taken from the Venetians.
Venice was at that point the most notable enemy of the Byzantine Empire. With its policy of dividing and weakening all contenders in order to come out on top, they tried by all available means to prevent Manuel II from entering into any negotiations with Beyazid. With its diplomatic power Venice ceaselessly stoked the anger of the Sultan and this plunged the Emperor into a kind of desperation just at a grave moment when he could find neither consolation nor help from anyone. For this reason he decided to dispatch his uncle Theodore Cantacuzene as ambassador to Venice, various Italian states and Paris.
The situation of the Empire became ever more desperate as time went on but the struggle for the throne did not ease up: John VII Palaeologus, Manuel’s nephew and Andronicus IV’s son, still challenged the new emperor for the throne and in his madness, in August of 1397 he went as far as to offer his rights to the King of France in exchange for a pension and a castle. Manuel never yielded in the face of these pretensions, nor did he yield to the temptation of exchanging his harsh, difficult and nearly impossible fate for a comfortable life in exile.
That same year Beyazid ordered the construction of a gigantic castle beside the Bosporus on its Asiatic coast. As the only possible answer, Manuel sent embassies with letters to the kings of France, England, Aragon, Muscovy, Poland and Kiev. He even sent an embassy to the Pope. All he received in reply were best wishes.
To the Prince of Muscovy, Basil I, Manuel sent an embassy pleading for money to sustain the precarious Byzantine situation, to which Basil responded with an undetermined sum that was still received with immense gratitude. It is known that this embassy did not ask the prince to send troops.
Regarding a request for troops, this fell flat or was at very least greeted with shock by the chroniclers in some western circles who were surprised to receive, for the first time in history, a plea for help of this sort from such a distant ruler. At least Charles VI, King of France, who had received Theodore Cantacuzene with wonder, sent the Emperor a small force of between 1,200 and 2,000 men under the command of the excellent Marshal Boucicaut, who already knew Constantinople from a trip he had made in his youth. He also sent 12,000 gold francs to cover military expenses and a few galleys that helped in the struggle. Boucicaut was a hero of the Battle of Nicopolis, where he fell prisoner to Beyazid and by some miracle was able to escape.
The arrival of this small army revitalized Manuel, who, together with Boucicaut made several tours of the Asiatic coast of the Sea of Marmara and the coasts of the Black Sea, devastating these regions and earning the respect of all the territories surrounding the capital, expelling the Ottomans from the area. Their campaign ended with an assault against and the total destruction of the castle of Riva, which defended the entrance to the Black Sea. With this campaign the Emperor broke the blockade that Beyazid had imposed on the City. In spite of this it was not enough to secure the nearby territories, which in turn forced a grave decision in this regard.
Manuel’s Trip to the West (1399-1403)
“The King [of England] may raise aid for us in soldiers, archers, money and ships which will land the army anywhere we ask.”
Manuel Palaeologus, Letter from London
One of the most notable events of the time was the famous trip to the West which Manuel carried out at the age of forty-nine. Marshal Boucicaut, whose real name was Jean le Meingre, carried out the essential task of reconciling Manuel with his hated nephew, John VII. Manuel made a trip to Selymbria where after a meeting with his nephew he was able to convince him to take charge of the City and remain loyal to him while he traveled overseas.
Manuel left together with his wife, his sons and his attendants, some forty persons in all, on 10 December, 1399. Boucicaut was convinced that the King of France would listen to Manuel and would offer much more help than he had given up to that moment.
In Constantinople, Manuel’s nephew John VII ruled as regent as had been agreed, but also in the City was Jean de Chateaumorand, delegate of Boucicaut, with three hundred French soldiers loyal to Manuel and a commission from the King of France as Captain in the City of Constantinople. Chateaumorand organized the defenses of the City and arranged them to repulse any attack and to maintain high moral among the people.
Manuel’s party first headed for Modon in the Peloponnesus, at that point in Venetian hands, although the Emperor’s family spent several days in Monemvasia. Then, all set sail for Venice, arriving in the Serenissima in April, 1400 according to some historians (even though there is no general agreement on this date). On his arrival in the city Manuel was received in magnificent style and lavished with gifts. While the Emperor remained for some time in the Republic with his family and party, Boucicaut left hurriedly for France where he prepared the way for an appropriate reception and for the Emperor’s audience with the King of France, Charles VI.
In Venice Manuel was well aware that he was not going to be able to achieve any great things, this being a quintessentially commercial republic seeing the world in a very different way. For example, he knew that the Serenissima had signed pacts with the Ottomans including with Beyazid himself, and thus would make no military commitments to Byzantium while the Empire was an enemy of the Turks. What is more, Manuel was well aware of the Venetian policy of playing one side against the other.
In Italy he may have had an audience with the Pope but many historians indicate that there is insufficient proof to say with certainty whether or not such an encounter might have actually taken place.
When he received word from the Marshal, Manuel and his whole party set out for Paris, passing through Padua, Vicenza, Pavia and Florence. From Florence he traveled to Milan and was hosted in the palace of Giovanni Galeano Visconti.
In Milan he met his personal friend Manuel Crisoloras, who was staying in Italy at the time. The party entered Paris on 3 June, 1400. Manuel was about to turn fifty years of age. In the capital of France Charles VI gave him an excellent reception and promised him many things. Several richly decorated rooms in the Palace of the Louvre were placed at the Emperor’s disposition.
A Frenchman who on this occasion met the Emperor personally described Manuel in these terms: “…of medium stature and regal bearing, with a long, graying beard.” In general, Manuel never failed to inspire admiration and respect, giving those who met him the impression of being in the presence of a true prince, earning the respect of all.
Manuel arrived in France at a moment of peace amid the so-called Hundred Years’ War. However, this calm could be broken at any moment. For this reason there was great tension among the local magnates and courtiers and if this were not bad enough, King Charles suffered recurring bouts of insanity which at that point were increasing in number and duration. In spite of this, Manuel received many promises during his visit although, given the special situation that the kingdom was going through, he had scant assurance that they would ever be fulfilled.
While he was in Paris Manuel contacted the kings of Navarre, Carlos III, of Castile, Enrique III, and of Aragon, Martin I, dispatching them letters by way of his ambassador, Alex Branas. He also dispatched an embassy to Henry IV of England. Along with the letters to these kings he also sent relics, bits of the tunic of Christ and fragments of the sponge of the Passion.
Meanwhile, on 27 May, 1400 Pope Boniface IX issued an encyclical exhorting all the faithful to take the cross in defense of the Christians of Constantinople, or, lacking that, to contribute financially to the upkeep of its defense.
Manuel spent more than four months in Paris where, in spite of the prevailing political tension, all was parties, receptions, banquets and hunting trips. He then left for Calais, where he arrived in September. He spent some time there while preparations were being made to receive him in England.
In December he sailed for England, first to Canterbury where he spent a few days, and then to London where he had an audience with Henry IV. A natural sympathy emerged between these two monarchs. At that moment Henry’s position as ruler of his kingdom was very unstable, given that many considered him to be a usurper. As the Duke of Lancaster he had just put an end to the dynasty of the Plantagents in England and was beginning a new era. However, his situation was still shaky and it was no cause for wonder that he had a very positive view of the Emperor. Manuel was given a gala reception, increasing the King’s prestige and reputation. On Christmas Day Henry invited Manuel to a splendid banquet in his palace at Eltham.
From Henry IV the Emperor received a certain amount of money (somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000 pounds) which had been promised by his predecessor, Richard II. The English king also promised soldiers and military assistance for Byzantium.
In February of 1401 Manuel returned to Paris where he stayed for some time and continued his written conversations with the King of Aragon and also with the King of Portugal, Joao I, as well as with the Pope of Avignon, the Antipope Benedict XIII, known as “papa Luna” (1394-1423). Martin I of Aragon went as far as to promise him six armed galleys to add to the forces that the King of France had promised him. Nonetheless, when Martin was advised by letter from the King of France, delivered by Branas, that he should prepare his galleys to sail along with the French galleys he complained that he was not offered sufficient warning, and given the last-minute notice excused himself from sending the aid he had promised.
In June, 1401 Manuel got into written contact with Pope Boniface IX (1389-1404) to whom he sent a letter and a fragment of the tunic of Christ. He surely wrote thanking the Pontiff for his encyclical, even though it had brought no visible results.
The Emperor’s image, character and personal intelligence left a great impression wherever he went and he was well received and respected by his western counterparts, awakening lively feelings in favor of his cause. However, he was unable to convince the kings of the gravity of his situation and many of the promises that were made to him went unfulfilled.
In spite of a full agenda of travel and audiences, Manuel was able to dedicate his time to writing theological tracts, descriptions of his visits and numerous letters to his friends in Byzantium.
In September, 1402 when he was still in Paris, Jean de Chateaumorand, de Boucicaut’s subaltern while the latter remained in Constantinople, handed Manuel the excellent news of the crushing defeat that had been inflicted upon Sultan Beyazid by Tamerlane’s Mongols in Ankara on 28 June. The Empire now had some cause for hope.
Tamerlane had been provoked by Beyazid when the latter demanded the vassalage of some of the Mongol leader’s dependent states. Tamerlane responded by invading Ottoman territories in Asia Minor beginning in 1400. He defeated the Mameluk emirates of Syria and then headed north to meet his arrogant rival.
The battle took place northeast of Ankara, in Tchibukabad. A contingent of galleys and soldiers from Trebizond was sent by the Emperor of that Christian state, Manuel III, to fight against the Turks and in support of Tamerlane. John VII too had collaborated with troops from Constantinople. In a treaty signed on 15 May, 1402 the Turks were forced to pay eternal tribute to Tamerlane.
In battle, Beyazid committed the monumental error of placing the Tartar cavalry at the front of his army. The Tartars’ lack of enthusiasm for fighting against their own Mongol brothers was well known. Equally well known was the character of Beyazid, who took pleasure in humiliating those whom he scorned. The most likely explanation is that he planned to force the Tartars to be killed fighting against their brothers, or perhaps he hoped that the Mongols would take mercy on their Tartar brothers. However, what happened was that the Tartar horsemen deserted and went over to the side of the enemy.
More than fifteen thousand Turks died on the battlefield. Several potential successors to the Turkish throne were killed or captured. Beyazid himself, after fighting valiantly for the whole day at the head of the Janissaries finally fled when his exhausted horse refused to go on, and was captured.
Tamerlane subjected the Sultan to terrible humiliations (it has been reported in several written sources of the period that the Sultan’s wife was forced to serve in the nude at the table of the Mongol leader), repaying Beyazid with interest for the cruel whims and degradations he had inflicted upon others during his life. These insults were aggravated by the fact that the Sultan was a man of proud and evil character. Beyazid died in the most utter abandonment eight months into his captivity, due to an attack of apoplexy. He could no longer swallow the pathetic life that he himself had dished out to those he had conquered.
Ottoman Asia Minor was destroyed and even the capital, Brusa, lay in ruins. It seemed as though Byzantium was gaining its second wind with the death of the man who had treated his subjects with such arrogance and scorn.
In October the Venetians had sent a letter to the Emperor in which they spoke of making a common front against the Ottomans, taking advantage of the Turkish defeat at the hands of the Mongols. With this they continued their masterful game of playing one side against the other.
Meanwhile, in November Manuel still had time to send a letter to Queen Margarita of Scandinavia through an ambassador, requesting aid to defend Byzantium from the Turks.
Before leaving France the Emperor donated an illuminated manuscript of the works of Dionysius the Aeropagite to the Monastery of St. Denis. The most fascinating aspect of this donation was that in one of the illustrations there were drawings of Manuel, his wife, and three of his children. This manuscript is still extant in the Museum of the Louvre.
Manuel left Paris in that same month of November and was received in 1403 in Genoa where he was met by his friend Boucicaut, who at that moment was the French governor of the city. The Venetians had a very negative view of this encounter and this friendship between their principal enemies, but when it was their turn they received the Emperor in grand style. Wishing to gain his favor, the Senate placed at his disposition three galleys and transported the forty members of the imperial party to Modon, sailing on 5 April. There they stayed until May. Finally, they traveled to Gallipoli where John VII went out to meet them, and the two returned together to Constantinople where they arrived on 9 June, 1403.
Manuel had been absent for three and a half years during which time his nephew John VII had not distinguished himself at the head of the Byzantine state, behaving as a simple vassal of the Sultan. Nonetheless, his help to Tamerlane and the treaty he had signed with the latter had been fortunate events.
Barely having returned to Constantinople, Manuel decided to eliminate the Turkish law-courts that functioned in the city and he closed and pulled down the mosques that the Ottomans had forced him to allow to be constructed, abolished all Turkish commercial rights, and of course removed John VII from the throne, returning to his own rightful place as head of Orthodox Christendom and of the Byzantine Empire.
Manuel was a very special person who was well aware how difficult the future might be and accepted reality with a resignation that did not distain action or taking whatever measures that might be necessary to rehabilitate, to the degree possible, the fallen Empire.
Manuel’s trip to the West had been disappointing in the sense that the various governments’ promises of aid went mostly unfulfilled. However, it constituted a true political advance in the context of European East-West relations at the end of the Middle Ages with all that this meant immediately preceding the western Renaissance and the new status of the East under Ottoman domination, which imposed its own distinctive characteristics upon the region.
Relations with the Kingdom of Aragon
After his trip to the lands of the West, Manuel never stopped wondering whether the friendly correspondence that he had had with the Kingdom of Aragon, and personally with its king, Martin I, might offer him a certain degree of help to strengthen his rule in the Empire and its region. His permanent correspondence relationship with the kings of Aragon during the rest of his life and his constant allusions to a hope that he might be able to count on their aid, his embassies, all of this makes us think that the Emperor always kept this in mind, even though in reality the results did not go beyond a simple expression of wishes and friendly greetings.
Manuel wrote a letter to Martin I on 23 October, 1407 and he sent Manuel Crisoloras to deliver it personally. He left that same October, reaching Venice in December and Genoa in April, 1408. He arrived in Barcelona after two years of travel, delivered the letter to Martin I together with the precious relics that the king had requested, and immediately dedicated himself to the tasks of diplomacy. On 7 April, 1410 he received a safe-conduct pass to return to Constantinople with his belongings. Martin I died in May of that same year, whether before or after Crisoloras left Barcelona we do not know.
The emperor wrote a new letter to Martin’s successor in Aragon, Fernando I (1410-1416) from Thessalonica on 28 November, 1414, wishing for friendship between Byzantines and Aragonese and saying that he had felt a great happiness upon learning that Fernando had a naval force available with which to help his son Theodore, Despot of the Morea.
The exchange of letters was ongoing even though at that moment Byzantium, especially after 1411, had become involved in the civil war of succession for the Ottoman throne. In 1413 the arrival of Mehmet I to the throne with Manuel’s help assured peaceful coexistence between Turks and Byzantines. For this reason the tone of Manuel’s letters became one of simple friendship without any consideration of once again asking for help as in the times of Beyazid.
We also know of letters sent by the Emperor to Alfonso the Magnanimous (1416-1458). When Manuel appointed Paulo Sofiano as ambassador, he complained before the King of Aragon about the actions of Catalan pirates in his homeland. This complaint could be interpreted as the end of friendly relations, at least in the mind of the emperor, now disappointed after the hoped-for assistance never arrived.
Manuel intervenes in the Ottoman struggles for succession.
Following the death of Beyazid his oldest son Suleiman, who dominated the European part of the nascent Ottoman Empire, tried to grab the throne even though Turkish law did not grant any special rights to the first-born, involving himself in a true war of succession against three of his brothers. This is why, beginning in 1403, he signed several treaties with the various powers who still kept the Balkans unstable, that is, with Venice, Genoa, Rhodes, Serbia and Byzantium, and was very benevolent in his conditions, trying to achieve accords in his own favor to assure himself faithful allies in the future. As regards the Empire, it was no longer considered a vassal-state of the Sultan and it no longer had to pay any sort of tribute. Suleiman even considered the Emperor as his senior sovereign and returned Thessalonica and surrounding territories, several islands of the Aegean Sea, and the coast of the Black Sea up to Varna. The new Sultan also freed hundreds of prisoners who returned to the City.
Suddenly the Empire found its domains expanded, its commitments to pay tribute cancelled and it enjoyed an unexpected time of peace. It seemed that a miracle had taken place, but nonetheless Byzantium remained dependent on shifts of the Ottoman political wind, because any change that occurred there could mean life or death for Byzantium. For this reason Manuel always remained alert to these changes, trying as much as possible to influence the Ottomans to choose rulers who preferred to live in peace and enjoy their new-found riches instead of the glory of destroying the Empire. Thus, while Suleiman governed from Adrianople, Manuel was confident but wary, trying to use the time available to him in the best way possible and awaiting a future that was unpredictable in many aspects.
In any case, Manuel’s efforts were always focused on getting out from under the thumb of his infidel neighbors in spite of all the peace policies that he would put into effect. For example, it is known that in January, 1407 he made contact with Venice to try to find help, but the Venetians, faithful to their own policy of n committing themselves to anyone in particular, did nothing but drag out negotiations which, as always, ended up going nowhere. The same thing happened with the requests of Sigismund of Hungary in 1408 and Stephen Lazarevich two years before. Venice was not a power that one could trust and they only sold their services very dearly and to those who could offer them the most benefits, regardless of religion or beliefs.
Several years later following a cruel civil war the Sultan's brother, Musa, who had formed an army and had the same lust for power and the same flighty and cruel character as his father Beyazid, conquered Adrianople by fire and sword in early 1411. Musa had Suleiman strangled. He sought blood vengeance against the Byzantines who had supported Suleiman and immediately besieged Constantinople in August without success. He then attempted to take Selymbria and finally Thessalonica, with the same negative results.
Manuel, with a good vision of Ottoman politics, secretly sent an embassy to Musa’s other brother, Mehmet, who was located in Brusa. With the embassy he sent ships to collaborate with Mehmet against Musa. The Serbian Despot, Stephen Lazarevich, joined Manuel’s policy and together they helped Mehmet overcome the unstable Musa in Camurlu, Serbia, on 5 July 1413. Mehmet immediately had Musa strangled.
Thus, as a result of his intervention in the Ottoman succession process Manuel was able to gain eight years of peace and stability that Mehmet I assured him in gratitude for the assistance he had received. For Mehmet the most important aspect of his domestic policy was consolidating his domains in Asia Minor, leaving the Balkans in the status quo and at peace.
Manuel was thus once again able to win a triumph worthy of his Byzantine ancestors and proved that the Empire still had the power to inflict pain and to act as arbiter of the international affairs in which it was involved. So important was his victory that one can see evidence of it in the words of gratitude of the new Sultan, Mehmet: “Go tell my father, the Emperor of the Romans, that from this day forward I am and shall be subject to him as a son is to his father. He has only to order me to do his will and with the greatest of pleasure I will carry out his orders as his servant.”
Mehmet returned Ottoman-Byzantine relations to the point where they were during the sultanate of Suleiman. Byzantium had a shred of hope.
At this point there was a very interesting occurrence: the uprising led by one of Beyazid’s sons whom all had given up for dead in the Battle of Ankara: Mustafa. He led the uprising of an entire army against Mehmet, with the supposed support of Manuel and of Mircea, a Rumanian prince. Nonetheless, Mustafa was quickly defeated by the Sultan but escaped with the help of the Venetians, whose usual policy at that point was to get involved in every dispute. The Ottoman pretender ended up in Thessalonica where Andronicus, Manuel’s son, gave him protection.
Mehmet became offended but Manuel, showing the best of his wisdom and diplomatic skill, sentenced Mustafa to spend the rest of his life on the Isle of Lemnos. Now Manuel had a pretender to the Ottoman throne in his hands to be utilized whenever convenient. Even though this did not suit Mehmet very well he had no other alternative than to accept it. However, Mircea was abandoned by Manuel to his own fate and lost Dobruja to the Sultan, who then built fortresses in his territory north of the Danube and forced him to pay tribute. Mehmet was thus able to increase his power and establish himself more and more firmly in the Balkans as time went on.
There is another odd anecdote of the same era involving the same two rulers, related to us by Sfranzes: On a certain occasion when Mehmet had requested permission to pass near Constantinople in his boat, Manuel took advantage of the occasion to take a sail in his own imperial yacht and positioned it parallel to the Ottoman craft. Thus near to each other, the two rulers chatted amiably for some minutes. Once on the Asian shore, the Sultan pitched his tents, but Manuel did not leave. Instead, he followed with his own boat and ended up dining together, sharing the most exquisite dishes together with his Ottoman counterpart. Thus were relations between these two great men.
Correct Policy?
This policy of Manuel’s has been severely criticized by some historians (e.g., Louis Brehier) who consider that the Emperor wasted a great opportunity to destroy Ottoman power for good. Their contention is not without basis since when Beyazid died along with virtually his entire army he left behind a still-unconsolidated country in a sad state of affairs. The fact is that in Europe the Ottomans dominated a jumble of vassal states without any particular central organization beyond the person of the Sultan. Their rule depended on the personal strength of the Sultan himself, while in Asia Ottoman power lay almost completely destroyed. Thus the help that Mehmet received to consolidate his power, the loan of ships to enable the future Sultan’s army to cross into Europe to fight against Musa, and the peace in which he was left during those years, can all be seen as a Byzantine push for the recovery of the Ottoman Empire. What is more, it was under Mehmet that the latter consolidated itself as a state and was able to impose homogeneity upon many of its loyal areas in Europe. This would in turn lead to a long campaign to bring Asia Minor back under its control, including Karamania, which was so wary of Ottoman power. Thus Mehmet was able to accomplish that which Beyazid had been unable to achieve during his own lifetime.
This could well be taken as Manuel’s error, provided Byzantium and the Serbian princes would have had sufficient power to defeat the Sultans. However, the need for peace was as great in Byzantium and the rest of the Christian Balkans as it was in the Sultanate. It is even possible to establish with a degree of certainty that the Byzantine Empire’s need for conciliation was much greater than that of its rivals.
Definitely, Mehmet derived benefit from the help and the stability that Manuel and the Christian princes offered him, and which allowed him to consolidate a state that Beyazid never even dreamed of,. However, Byzantium too needed this time of concord and friendship in order to organize its territories. Its emperor took particular advantage of the moment to organize the Despotate of Mistra, where the last hand was played in a gamble to regain the glory of the Empire, this time under the aura of Hellenism.
In any case, this policy was the only one possible at the moment and in fact was much better than the fearsome double-dealing of the Venetians who were always ready to sell to the highest bidder, even when the ones benefiting would be the Ottoman Turks.
Surely, Venice and its rivals, Hungary and Genoa, were much more to blame than Manuel’s and the Serbian princes’ peace for the fact that Christendom did not take more advantage of the Ottoman’s woes. Indeed, their actions were much more damaging that the indifference shown by the rest of the West.
One fact points out the truth of who were really to blame for allowing the Ottomans to recover from the defeat of 1402: On 29 May 1416, Venetian and Ottoman naval squadrons faced off close to the port of Gallipoli and Admiral Loredan totally destroyed the Turkish fleet. The victory led to the signing of a peace treaty between Mehmet and Venice, an accord which benefited the latter while leaving the other Christian states of the Balkans totally in the lurch. Without room for doubt, Venetian policy had very narrow objectives, was totally self-serving and was utterly short-sighted, ultimately benefiting the Turks much more than the peace Manuel had made with Mehmet.
The emperor protects Mistra like a jewel in his crown.
While the once-great city of Constantinople continued to crumble, punished in its decline by the Italian republics’ economic domination, the Ottomans’ blockade and the West’s oblivion, in the south of the Isthmus of Corinth in the Peloponnesus its culture was being reborn under the care of strong and valiant men, at first led by John Cantazuzene’s second son, Manuel, starting in 1349, and then after some years by Matthew Cantacuzene as Despot, and after some struggle, by Demetrius Cantacuzene. Theodore, brother of Manuel, was the first Palaeologus to become its ruler in 1384.
Theodore had to fight against the Navarre Company which had great interests in the region, as well as the Turks who devastated the region in 1394. He reconstructed the Hexamilion Wall in 1395, but the Ottomans crossed it once again in 1397 and inflicted losses on the region.
With their unbounded ambition the Knights of Rhodes also caused enormous damage, pressing Theodore to sell several cities including Mistra, until the timely intervention of the emperor Manuel managed to make them withdraw from the Peloponnesus, but only after return of the money the Knights had invested, plus interest and penalties.
Theodore died in 1407, having retired some time before from the office of Despot to become the monk Theodoret due to the sadness and bitterness that weighed upon him because of the untenable situation that he faced every day. To him Manuel dedicated an emotional eulogy reflecting the great love he felt for his late brother.
Manuel knew that this territory was the only remaining possibility for the Empire to continue on as a living nation, given its growing culture and typically Byzantine elegance with beautiful churches erected by local families. Nonetheless, these very same families continued to pose a grave problem for the emperors and despots, given their tendency to consider themselves politically autonomous on their own landholdings. For this reason Manuel named his second son, Theodore, at twelve years of age to be Mistra’s new despot. The Empire thus ensured that power would remain in hands of the imperial family with the security this implied, at least for the moment. Theodore’s regent until he reached adulthood was Manuel Francopoulo, member of one of the Emperor’s most faithful families. The Sovereign went in person to Mistra to ensure that all would be according to his orders regarding the young Despot.
That same year John VII, then governor of Thessalonica, died without heirs. Manuel installed his son Andronicus, barely eight years old, as the new ruler. The idea of ruling in Constantinople, Thessalonica and Mistra and thus uniting the separate pieces of the Empire was running through Manuel’s head in those years, an idea that he realized for the moment by posting his small sons to each capital.
It was in these years that the figure of Plethon appears in Mistra with all its power, with which many intellectuals of the Empire and the West began to be drawn to this Peloponnesian city seeking the opportunity to debate and learn from the Byzantine philosopher. Thus was formed a true cultural court-life in Mistra, which distinguished itself as the center of the new Hellenism. The Empire was not yet dead but rather very much to the contrary, and from Mistra showed that it could still shine a light of hope, guided in government by Manuel’s sons and in thought by Plethon. Plethon wished to transform the Peloponnesus into the point of departure for a renovation of the Byzantine Empire into a Hellenic Empire with a return to the gods of yesteryear and the government forms proposed by the philosopher Plato.
Plethon was convinced that his project was perfectly practical and the basis of his project was that which the philosopher affirmed about the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, that they were the purest descendents of the ancient Greeks.
In spite of this, there is an extant work of his contemporary, Mazaris (“Mazaris’ Trip to Hell”) in which he strongly deprecates the inhabitants of the Byzantine Morea and where he argues that the residents of the Peloponnesus can be divided into seven different nationalities: Greeks, Peloponnesians, Lacaeaemonian Greeks, Latins or Italians, Slavs, Albanians, Gypsies and Jews. These indeed were the characteristics of the population of the Despotate of Mistra at the end of the Middle Ages, which gives a very different result from that proposed by the Byzantine philosopher.
Plethon’s dreams were fully expressed only in two letters, really demands, one addressed to Manuel and the other to the Despot Theodore, plus in a few scraps of his written work, most of which was burned in later years. However, this does not take away from the significance of his work as an important step that the Empire took toward a pure Hellenism; a direction that could well have marked the future of Byzantium had it survived.
With all, the Morea found itself immersed in a climate that seems to have led it to turn in upon itself. In the midst of the constant squabbles of the archons, the local aristocracy sometimes recognized no power superior to itself. There were barbarous practices of people who lived in a state of virtual savagery (we know, for example, of the custom of “mascalism,” the mutilation of the corpses of fallen enemies), particularly following the immigration of many primitive peasants from isolated areas of the Balkans. We know that Manuel took positive measures against these barbarous customs that turned the country into a kingdom isolated from its people. For example, in a chrysobull he explicitly prohibited “mascalism.”
The trip to the Peloponnesus (1413-1416)
“Many savage areas that once served for nothing but bandits’ dens are now being plowed, and, in the hands of expert farmers, are being planted and sowed in diverse fashion.”
Manuel II Palaeologus, referring to the Despot of Mistra.
Manuel was sure that the intentions of Mehmet I were to ensure political stability in Asia Minor, a territory in that moment torn by instability, and thus he felt he had enough breathing space to carry out another trip. In 1413 he traveled to Thessalonica where he would stay for more than a year, exercising his authority from the second capital of the Empire.
Then, in March of 1415 he traveled on to the Byzantine Morea where he continued to prove that literature and the arts in the Empire were not dead, but much to the contrary, were in true apogee, thanks to the work of citizens like Gemistus Plethon, an intellectual and a dreamer who longed for the rebirth of a Hellenic state in the Peloponnesus.
Manuel came ashore close to Corinth on 13 March. The Latin prince of Achaia, Centurione Zaccaria, immediately set out to render homage to him.
Manuel ordered that the Hexamilion Wall be once again reconstructed in order to protect the Despotate of the Morea, his most prized possession, from the Turkish advance. This wall crossed the entire Isthmus of Corinth and this initiative was meant to send a signal that the Empire was not yet dead, but rather was still seeking a space within which to once again develop itself.
The Emperor was intelligent enough to understand that a large part of Byzantium’s future was at stake in this beautiful area, with its powerful lords who were forever defying imperial authority, because of its natural propensity for independence and autonomy. Manuel’s stay in the Peloponnesus came to play a politically important role by reaffirming imperial authority over all his territories and lending strength to the continued restoration of the Empire. One example of this occurred during the reconstruction of the famous Hexamilion Wall. The Greek nobility of the Peloponnesus were forced to cover the costs of this project, which pleased them not at all. Together they rose up against the order, uniting in rebellion. In Calamata Manuel once again showed what he was made of when he managed to overcome the rebels and impose upon them a due respect for his person. From then on the relationship between the Emperor and the nobility of the Peloponnesus was, if not easier, at least clearer.
The clearest case of the Peloponnesian aristocrats’ aspirations for independence or was in the fact that they no longer distinguished between their own possessions and the lands that they administered under pronoia. Manuel left in the hands of the local gentry the power to use state lands and goods, in hopes of gaining their favor, but they took pronoia as their own right.
In spite of all his efforts the Emperor could not prevent a significant part of the Byzantine population from moving to the Venetian colonies in search of a more stable, more protected life, and in order to not work on the tasks of defending the Peloponnesus.
Manuel returned to Constantinople in March of 1416 but left John, his heir (the future emperor John VIII) in charge of government along with his younger brother Theodore and began preparations for invading Achaia, which was occupied by the Latins. The incursions were successful, once again demonstrating that united, the Byzantines could continue forward. They were able to conquer almost the entire principality of Centurione Zaccaria and were it not for the intervention of Venice, as always, they would have completely occupied it.
In that same year there was in the cities of the Empire a vicious plague which left the population significantly reduced, most particularly in the capital. As if there were not enough misfortunes befalling the Empire, this plague was evidently much more virulent than those which would every so often spread throughout the region.
In 1418 Theodore and John would be joined by their brother Thomas in order to strengthen Theodore’s government, but shared among the brothers, transforming Mistra into a very important political meeting center for Byzantine rulers.
Nonetheless, the economic situation continued to be dire even in Mistra, where except for the noble and aristocratic families of the Byzantine cities that were loyal to the Emperor, the rest, particularly the common people, did not pay their taxes. It was nearly impossible to collect taxes and when forced to pay the peasants fled, as we have mentioned above, to Venetian territory in search of a different future. Even the noble families, in many cases, preferred to “guard” their money in Venetian currency, for there was no longer any confidence in the coinage of the Palaeologians.
Manuel and the Church
The patriarchs of Constantinople who trod the streets of Byzantium together with Manuel were Anthony IV (first time: 1389-90, second time: 1391-97), Macarios, (second time: 1390-91), Calixtus II Xantopoulo (1391), Matthew I (1397-1410), Eutemius II (1410-16) and Joseph II (1416-39).
Manuel was an eminent writer and an expert in the field of theology. For this reason he was able to maintain good relationships with all the patriarchs of his time, the ones who held the real power among the faithful. Being that he did not advocate a union of the churches (which was another name for the submission of the Orthodox Church to the Roman), he earned the confidence of the faithful and the respect of the Patriarchs. In spite of the fact that his trip to the West made him suspect in the eyes of the devoted citizens of the Empire, they finally ended up understanding that the Emperor, whatever may be his thinking, would never sell them out to the Papacy.
There was, however, a motive for complicated conflict when Manuel ordered the monasteries of Mount Athos to turn half of their wealth over to him. Nonetheless there was no turning back, and the church turned over half of its riches to contribute to the struggle. Manuel did no more than follow the Byzantine custom of trying to confiscate the wealth of the church when there was no other way to pay for its defense, and the monks and the monasteries eventually understood the emperor’s reasons for what he did.
Another of his decrees which, even though it did not have to do with the Orthodox Church, was a decision taken as absolute head of the Eastern church was that of sending a delegation to the Council of Constance to present a series of petitions that could arrange the assistance of the pontiff-elect, Martin V, in fortifying the Peloponnesus by restoring the Hexamilion Wall.
We know that in spite of everything that happened in the Balkans, in spite of the loss of territory on the part of the Empire, of its loss of prestige and vitality, both the eastern Christian nations and their common people continued to consider the Emperor the head of the Church, with all that this signified. But without any doubt, if he had not enjoyed the support of the various patriarchs Manuel would not have been able to put his policies into effect under any pretext. In spite of the fact that respect for the person of the emperor remained unshaken among the people, their true guides were the patriarchs of the Orthodox Church who held the real power over the people.
We particularly know about the position favorable to the union of the churches held by Joseph, the patriarch who served in the latter part of Manuel’s reign and the beginning of that of John VIII. Without any doubt, Manuel was in agreement with him but Joseph could not put forth any gesture toward union while Manuel was in charge of the Empire. Years later, the policy that John VIII practiced in favor of union was very different.
The return of Ottoman belligerency.
With the death of Mehmet I in 1421 the Ottoman Empire returned to its ancient tradition of conquest, this time at the hands of its inheritor, Murad II (1421-1451).
That same year John VIII was crowned co-emperor when Manuel w as seventy years old, tired and with little energy remaining. The Emperor, perhaps thinking of the problems that he himself had in succeeding his father, clearly designated his firstborn as successor, initiating him into the tasks of government and trusting in his abilities from the beginning. For this reason he made John marry Sofia of Montferrat, which gave him a family link with one of the most influential families of the West even though in reality this forced marriage was a great disappointment. Manuel did the same thing with all his other sons, imposing marriage on them with Western ladies of good family in hopes of future alliances. This was nothing new for an imperial family; the Comneni family had done it three centuries before, even though it was impossible until the end of the era of the Macedonian dynasty.
John pretended that the legitimate successor of Mehmet was our friend Mustafa, who was still a captive on the Isle of Lemnos, because this way he could ensure that the Ottomans would continue to follow the policy of peace and conciliation followed by his predecessor. The fact is that Mustafa promised eternal peace if only he would receive help, and he offered the Byzantines many concessions.
Manuel did not agree that it was wise to utilize Mustafa so hastily and so early in the game and Murad II even offered the Emperor the city of Gallipoli as a show of good will in order to be an ally of the Empire. In spite of this, being that Manuel was by now very tired and semi-retired from politics in a Constantinople monastery, he had to yield to the vitality of John who thought that his plan would work perfectly and that a new era would stand open before the Empire with Mustafa’s victory.
Mustafa was freed and immediately proclaimed himself Sultan in Rumelia, the European region dominated by the Ottomans, and quickly managed to recruit an army of supporters. Immediately, with the help of Djuneid, he besieged Gallipoli, a key position for the transfer of troops between Europe and Asia. The Byzantines who were aiding Mustafa carried on the siege of the city while the Ottoman rebel chief left for Adrianopolis. Murad sent an army against him but it was defeated in late 1421. On learning of this news Gallipoli surrendered to Mustafa. In spite of this, Mustafa ordered that no one enter Gallipoli, sending his forces immediately to Constantinople, perhaps fearing betrayal by Byzantine troops.
At this point Manuel wished to return to negotiations with Murad but the Sultan’s feelings remained hurt, and he ended up signing a treaty with the Genoese, who still had important interests in the region and would be an important ally of the Ottomans following Venice’s lead in undermining all the other Christians of the region.
Mustafa moved his troops to Asia and on 20 January, 1422, came face to face with Murad’s army. Betrayed by Djuneid who abandoned him shortly before the battle, Mustafa had no other alternative than to flee, because without his ally his forces were greatly weakened. Murad pursued Mustafa into Rumelia and managed to capture him close to Adrianopolis, where he ordered him to be publicly hanged.
John’s plan went awry and the only thing it accomplished was to awaken Murad’s thirst for vengeance. He who at the beginning was unwilling to go to war now regarded the Byzantines as foes to the death.
On 8 June, 1422 Murad, after imposing a total blockade on Thessalonica (where Andronicus, son of Manuel, was located) in order to isolate the City, installed all his armies outside the walls of the capital in a bid to take it by force and thus to redress the insult that the Byzantines had offered him by supporting his rival. His soldiers dug a trench along the city walls from the Marmara to the Golden Horn. His catapults were easily able to strike beyond the limits of the walls.
With Manuel now old and tired, retired to a monastery, John VIII was in charge of the defense of the City and he worked tirelessly to keep the Ottoman army from entering the City. With his efforts he was able to avoid a catastrophe.
It is often said that a Turkish mystic named Sayeed Bojari told Murad that on 24 August the city would fall for the last time. The inhabitants suffered through a 77 day siege and the fall of the City was, according to calculations, possible any day, but Murad was superstitious and was sure of victory on that day because of what he had heard from the holy man, who was said to be descended from the Prophet. He concentrated all his efforts and tried with all his power to smash his way into the City. Many Ottomans fought to the death and others were gravely wounded, but they were unable to break through the walls. Some time in the afternoon, panic overcame the invaders, who burned their towers and fled in desperation. John had made an excellent sally with his troops, killing many of the enemy. Finally only a few Turkish contingents remained watching over the towers of the City, and the next day the siege was definitively lifted.
Manuel had not remained inactive. Although old and exhausted, he never stopped considering himself the Emperor of Byzantium, and it was always he who pulled the strings of Ottoman politics. He returned to act with his accustomed intelligence, forming a secret alliance with the youngest son of Mehmet, also named Mustafa, thirteen years of age, proposing his help to get the young man to the throne and replace the now-hated Murad II. However, this time luck was not with Manuel. Mustafa was defeated and the Emperor ended up realizing that Murad II was able to overcome one difficulty after another with great determination. Perhaps fortune had gone over to the side of the Sultan.
Since 1422 Thessalonica had been blockaded by Murad II’s troops and hunger was taking its toll among the city’s population. Andronicus, Manuel’s son who governed the city and who had lived there since he was very small, was at this point still quite young but was gravely ill and felt unable to overcome the dangerous situation that he had been living through for more than a year. He asked Manuel for permission to surrender the city to the Venetians. At that moment Manuel must have remembered his own role at the head of the city some years before, and how he had to yield to the demands of the besieged citizens who could no longer bear the situation of Ottoman blockade, and the lesson that his father John V taught him, confining him to the Isle of Lemnos for disobedience and causing grave damage to the Empire. He granted his son’s request. John, now co-emperor, was in agreement, realizing that it was not in his power to help Andronicus.
The surrender to Venice was carried out in exchange for six transport ships full of food and a promise to respect the citizens’ political institutions and religious beliefs.
The city of Thessalonica passed into Venetian hands at a terrible moment in its history: impoverished, victim of successive waves of plague and the exodus of many of its inhabitants, at that moment it probably did not have more than 40,000 citizens left.
Andronicus withdrew to Mistra to spend the last months of his life together with his beloved brothers. If there was one thing that Manuel did achieve it was ensuring that all his sons remained closely united, something that did not exactly characterize the Palaeologus family in general. Even then there were some differences of opinion and problems as well as much later, when it was time for John VIII to succeed to the throne. However, in the Emperor’s lifetime foreign influences were never permitted to divide the family as had happened, for example, in the case of Andronicus IV, Manuel’s brother. The only exception was Demetrius, who was implicated in uprisings against John and Constantine when the latter became emperors and who also challenged the rule of Thomas in Mistra. But this did not reach the level of importance of other historic uprisings, and thus his importance was not decisive in the historical development of the Empire.
In November John left on a trip to the West, visiting Venice, Milan, Mantua and Hungary without being able to obtain any concrete support. All hope for Byzantium was slowly but inexorably slipping away.
The End
“Never had there been seen such a great number of weeping men at an emperor’s funeral.”
George Sfranzes
In 1422 Manuel suffered an attack of apoplexy, which left most of his body paralyzed. Due to this, the Emperor spent the last years of his life bedridden although hardly inactive. His hopes, which he had maintained throughout the long years of his maturity and which he always put at the service of the Empire, were now disappearing ever since the rise of Murad II and the failure of the revolt that had been prepared to place Mustafa on the throne. Fate was no longer smiling on Manuel or on Byzantium, and the future promised only more calamities.
Manuel’s son John had been educated as an emperor should, but he was too impetuous and politically much less astute than his father. One cannot say that Manuel regretted his decision to name John his successor and co-emperor, but in these words that he spoke to his friend George Sfranzes one may see a reflection of Manuel’s thoughts about the future, which came true only a few years later: “In other times of our history, my son could have been a great Basileus, but today our Empire does not need a great Basileus, but rather a great regent. And I fear that his grandiose plans and enterprises will bring this house to ruin.” Thus did Manuel refer to John VIII, and thus did he prophesy the future of the empire.
The proof that even when bedridden he was important for the Empire is shown by the final treaty that he arranged, forced by circumstances to gain a bit of breathing space for the Empire. For this purpose in 1424 he sent George Sfrantzes and two other ambassadors to negotiate a treaty with Murad, while John VIII was away visiting the West. The ambassadors agreed to the delivery of a monetary tribute to the Sultan, and yielding all the Black Sea ports with the exception of Mesembria and Dercos while keeping Strymon and Zeitun. According to some historians this treaty marked the shameful culmination of Manuel’s reign. But this is not true. What Manuel always had was an exacting sense of reality and at that moment he applied it to what he had always practiced: the politics of the possible. He had no other option, and he cannot be criticized for that. The emperor once again demonstrated that for every situation he had a response, even though to us it may seem a surrender. In reality there was no other alternative, given the desperate situation that was facing Byzantium.
The Emperor died on 21 July, 1425 at seventy-five years of age, to the grief of a people who loved him deeply and sincerely and who mourned that this great ruler was not able to improve the situation of the Empire while all of Western Christendom gave him a deaf ear. Even though we do not know with certainty if Manuel was convinced about a union with the Western church, although it seems most likely that he was, what is clear is that he was not like his father, an emperor who would turn his back on the feelings of the people. On the contrary, he never spoke of submission, nor did he kneel down weeping before any other ruler pleading for help.
Everything was in accordance with his ever-unique, spellbinding, firm and cultured personality. In particular, he always carefully respected the sentiments of the Byzantine people who had suffered such cruel blows in recent years.
As we have said above, Manuel has been unjustly attacked and insulted by many historians who obviously scorn this period of Byzantine history and consider that it no longer merits their attention. In spite of this, the facts, the life work of this great figure shine by their own light and deserve a recognition that, even though it might be six centuries late in arriving, proves that for history the passage of time is of little importance. Certain facts come to the light of day sooner or later. And even though in the course of his life he suffered enormous humiliations and committed grave errors as have been described in this work, this does no more than give the real measure of his indomitable spirit which did not resign itself to the status quo and always remained in motion seeking to achieve better things, almost always, of course, within the real possibilities of the moment.

Appendix: Testimonies
Letter of Manuel to his friend and ambassador, Crisoloras.
This is part of the text of a letter that Manuel II (1391-1425), sent from London to Manuel Crisoloras while visiting the court of Henry IV (1399-1413).
“So, what is the reason for this letter?...
The main reason is to speak to you about the ruler in whose court we are at present, of a second civilized world, we could say, in which reigns an abundance of good qualities adorned with all manner of virtues…
This ruler, then, is immensely illustrious because of his position, and also because of his intelligence; his power is admired by all, and his discernment raises up friends for him. He extends his hand to all, and in a multitude of forms he puts himself at the service of those who are in need of help.
And now, in accord with nature, he has created a true paradise for us in the midst of a double storm, that of the weather and that of fortune, and I believe that we have found refuge both in the man himself and in his character.
His conversation is most welcome for us and pleases us in all senses; he honors us with the highest honors and holds us in high regard.
Even though he has gone to the extreme in all his favors, he almost blushes in the belief, and it is well that he alone should think thus, that he has fallen vastly short in everything he has done.
Such is the magnanimity of this man… he has in the end given sufficient proof of his nobility by adding a royal touch to our dealings, showing the merit of his character and of the negotiations themselves.
Well, he is providing us military assistance, with soldiers, archers, funds and vessels to transport the army wherever it is needed.”
Reflections of an English chronicler about the situation of Byzantium in 1401.
Referring to the visit of Manuel II Palaeologus to the Western world desperately seeking aid in the face of the Turkish threat, Adam of Usk made the following comments [retranslated from Spanish]:
Within myself I considered how painful it must be that this great prince of the faraway East has found himself forced by the infidel threat to visit the far isles of the West to ask for help against them.
My God! Where hast thou gone, glory of ancient Rome?
The greatness of the Empire is now fallen to pieces and one may describe it by applying the words of Jeremiah, “She who was considered in the eyes of the nations the princess of all the provinces has now been submitted to tribute.”
Who could have believed that thou wouldst fall into such profound misery, that thou, after having once ruled the world on a sublime throne, wouldst come to have no power to succor the Christian faith?
This emperor always moves about with his men, all dressed in the same color, white, with long tunics cut like tabards; he finds fault in the many styles and distinctions of attire of the English, which in his opinion are a sign of inconstancy and voluble temperament.
Never has a knife touched the heads or the beards of his chaplains.
These Greeks are very devoted to their church services, in which both soldiers and priests take part, with all singing without distinction in their native language…
As to myself, I thought of the terrible experience that one could suppose forced the great Christian prince of the faraway East, driven by the infidels to visit the distant lands of the West to seek help against them.
I think that no comments are necessary. It is only necessary to say that the title used by the two chroniclers, of “great prince of the faraway East” evokes in addition to a respectful phrase the distance that separated the Western world from the Byzantine in that era. One also thinks of the words of Manuel II in his letter to Crisoloras from London, “a second civilized world,” referring to the court of Henry IV, which evokes that same degree of distance and his surprise upon finding educated and cultured people so far from Byzantium (in spite of the shrunken state of the Empire they still considered themselves to be “civilization”).
 

Rolando Castillo

Translated by Owen Williamson